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A Step in the Right Direction for Japan's
Judicial Reform: Impact of the Justice
System Reform Council
Recommendations on Criminal Justice
and Citizen Participation in Criminal,
Civil, and Administrative Litigation
By HIROSHI FUKURAI*
I. Introduction
In commemorating the tenth year anniversary of the JSRC, the
UC Hastings conference assembled a group of socio-legal scholars
and legal experts from both Japan and the U.S. to analyze the extent
of the implementation of the judicial reforms suggested by the
Justice System Reform Council (hereinafter JSRC). The aim of this
article is to critically examine the impact of the JSRC's proposed
judicial reforms in the area of criminal justice and lay participation
in legal decision-making.
After two years of careful deliberation by the thirteen JSRC
members on potential reforms to the Japanese justice system, the
council finally submitted a detailed report (Ikensho) to Prime
Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi on June 12, 2001, outlining their
suggestions and recommendations. ' In this groundbreaking
* Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of California, Santa
Cruz. This research was supported by the 2009-2010 Toyota Foundation Grant
(D09-R-0081). I appreciate Professor Setsuo Miyazawa for organizing the
symposium at the University of California, Hastings College of Law. My
appreciation is also extended to Weiqi (William) Qiu for his editorial assistance.
1. Shih6 Seido Kaikaku Shingikai USRC], Shih6 Seido Kaikaku Shingikai
Ikensho: 21-seiki no nihon o Sasaeru Shih6 Seido [Report of the JSRC - A Justice
System for Japan in the 21st Century], June 12, 2001, available at
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/report/ikensyo/pdf-dex.htl
[hereinafter JSRC Report]. The official English translation entitled
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council -For a Justice System to
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document, the JSRC made specific proposals to introduce two
distinct systems of citizen participation in Japan's justice system: (1)
Saiban-in Seido (a quasi-jury system or mixed tribunal) and (2) a
revised Kensatsu Shinsakai (Japan's grand jury system or Prosecution
Review Commissions (PRC)).2 The establishment of these twin
bodies of lay adjudication was designed to broaden the institution of
decision-making in criminal matters to include a representative
panel of Japanese citizens chosen at random from local
communities. Japan once had an all-citizen jury system and began
to use jury trials in 1928, but the system was abruptly suspended by
the Japanese military government in 1943 in favor of a collegial
professional bench trial system.3 The lack of lay participation in the
justice system in the postwar era has led to the creation of symbiotic
power relations among three key agencies of Japan's criminal justice
system, namely the police, prosecutors' office, and the court. 4
The reintroduction of the citizen participation system in
criminal proceedings thus represented one of the fundamental
changes to Japan's legal structures and status quo, and this article
examines such changes in lay participation and its effects in the area
of criminal justice. Attorney Shunsuke Marushima who served as
Senior Staff of the Secretariat in the JSRC declared that much of the
reforms in criminal justice, especially with respect to prosecution
and police procedures, were expected to go through dramatic and
significant changes in their operational procedures because of
popular participation in the administration of criminal justice in
Japan.5 This suggests that a critical assessment of genuine effects of
Support Japan in the 21st Century- is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
2. Hiroshi Fukurai, The Re-birth of Japan's Petit Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury
Systems: A Cross-National Analysis of Legal Consciousness and the Lay Participatory
Experience in Japan and the U.S., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 315, 321-28 (2007).
3. Mamoru Urabe, A Study on Trial by Jury in Japan, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM 483-91 (Hideo Tanaka ed. 1976).
4. Japan is said to have the "world's highest conviction rate" of nearly 100%.
See generally DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN
JAPAN 215 (2002). Such a near-perfect conviction rate could not have been achieved
unless there has been a close and symbiotic collaborative working relation among
Japan's police agencies, public prosecutors' offices, and courts.
5. Interview with Shunsuke Marushima conducted by the author at the UC
Hastings College of the Law School (Sept. 8, 2012) (a interview report on file with
the author) (The introduction of "the Saiban-in system will undoubtedly force the
changes in the police procedure and investigative methods" and "reforms in the
PRC [Prosecutorial Review Comnmission] will lead to a discussion on the reform of
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the council recommendation in the area of criminal justice can be
best achieved in its relation to the operative and procedural impact
of the twin systems of lay adjudication.
Part II of this article first examines the two systems of lay
adjudication in criminal proceedings, including the Saiban-in Seido (a
quasi-jury system) and the revised Prosecution Review Commission
(PRC). The Saiban-in panel that consists of three professional and six
citizen judges adjudicates serious crimes committed in local
communities, much like citizen participation in America's petit-jury
trials.6 The PRC, on the other hand, asks eleven randomly chosen
Japanese citizens to examine the appropriateness of prosecutors'
non-indictment decisions, an adjudicative institution to which the
U.S. has no juridical equivalence. While the former deals
exclusively with the adjudication process of criminal matters in
Japan, the latter has a greater potential to influence the decisions
made by Japanese prosecutors. The strengths and weaknesses of
each of these systems will be critically examined.7
Part III then proceeds to analyze the criminal justice process
itself that has been significantly impacted with the introduction of
the two lay adjudication systems. At the outset, the JSRC
recommendation was apt to eliminate numerous causal factors
behind criminal procedural anomalies that previously led to not
only wrongful convictions but also violations of criminal
defendants' rights. For instance, the JSRC recommendation
suggested ensuring greater transparency to the usually closed
investigation and investigative processes, which in turn facilitated
the deliberation of lay participants in Saiban-in trials. This article
first examines how these problematic areas were impacted by the
introduction of Saiban-in trials, as they were also discussed and
debated by the JSRC members. These factors include: (1) the use of
police detention centers as "substitute prisons" for interrogation; (2)
limited access to counsel; (3) use of physical and psychological
torture to extract forced confessions; (4) judicial complacency
toward the use of confession documents obtained via dubious
means; and (5) the lack of pretrial release for defendants.
Part III will continue to examine other consequences of judicial
reforms that will invariably affect citizens' judicial capacities,
the procuracy.").
6. Fukurai, supra note 2, at 311-23.
7. Id. at 323-28.
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including the implementation of: (1) pretrial conference procedures;
(2) new victim participation systems that were first introduced in
2008 and later incorporated into the Saiban-in trial; and (3) the
National Public Defender System (Kokusen Bengo Seido) and the
Japan Legal Support Center on Saiban-in trials.
Part IV will shift my focus toward an evaluation of much
broader socio-legal impacts of the new systems of lay adjudication
on criminal procedure; I will consider if and to what extent these
new structures expanded citizens' ability to properly adjudicate
crimes committed by an exclusive group of foreigners who have
been historically protected under the rights of extraterritoriality,
including the members of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan.
The first Saiban-in trial of American military personnel took place in
May 2010 in Okinawa.8 The JSRC proposal also allowed the PRC to
enforce the criminal prosecution of formally called "untouchables,"
namely powerful politicians, government bureaucrats, and business
elites. The PRC's decision on the forceful prosecution of military
personnel also instigated a bilateral negotiation between the U.S.
and Japanese governments on the new conditions of the Status of
Forces of Agreement (SOFA), involving the right to exercise a
proper jurisdiction over military accidents or crimes committed by
armed personnel while on duty.9
Finally, Part V explores the potential expansion and diffusion of
Saiban-in trials into civil and administrative litigation. The JSRC has
already suggested the possibility of incorporating citizen
participation into certain classes of civil cases. And while the
possible incorporation of Saiban-in into administrative litigation will
also be explored here, the council has already recognized that
administrative trials regarding disputes against governmental
policies have been extremely difficult for citizens to adjudicate
effectively. Yet the relevance of such analyses cannot be overstated,
8. Hiroshi Fukurai, People's Panel vs. Imperial Hegemony: Japan's Twin Lay Justice
Systems and the Future of American Military Bases in Japan, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J.
95, 96 (2010).
9. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, AAFES Employee Indicted in Fatal
Collision, STARs & STRIPES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/aafes-
employee-indicted-in-fatal-collision-1.161616. For broader socio-legal
ramifications, see Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan's Lay Judges, and Why Australia Should
Listen Up, EAST ASIA FORUM (June 28, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2012 /0 6/ 2 8 /citizen-adjudication-systems-in-japan-and-why-australia-should-
follow-suit/.
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especially given the recent surge of civil and administrative lawsuits
filed against the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the
Japanese government in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear
disaster in March 2011.10 Active participation of citizens in the
adjudication of civil and administrative disputes has the potential to
ensure that the rights of victims in these types of cases are upheld
and their remedies properly dispensed. For these categories of
litigation, it is important to incorporate the people's fair-minded
perspectives and common sense judgments into the deliberation of
such legal disputes. Lastly, Part VI will conclude with a reprisal of
the overall impact of the JSRC recommendations on Japan's legal
landscape.
II. Two Pillars of Lay Adjudication: Saiban-in Seido and the
New Prosecution Review Commission (PRC or Japan's
Grand Jury System)
The JSRC suggested the introduction of two systems of lay
adjudication, namely, a hybrid model of citizen's legal participation
found in the Saiban-in trial and a revised PRC system that will
review prosecutors' non-indictment decisions. The JSRC
recommendation required that the PRC's deliberative decisions
would no longer serve as a mere advisory role to Japanese
prosecutors, but hold legally binding authority over prosecutorial
decision-making.1
In part, the introduction of the lay judge systems was suggested
by the JSRC members in response to the frequent criticisms of
Japan's criminal justice system's shortcomings in its failure to
prevent wrongful convictions and violation of criminal defendants'
rights, including the use of a police detention center as a substitute
prison to extract forced confessions, defendants' lack of access to
defense counsel or pretrial release of criminal suspects or
10. Yuko Kubota, Shareholders File $67 bln Lawsuit Against TEPCO Executives,
REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/tepco-
lawsuit-idUSL4E8E54M620120305 ("In the biggest claims of its kind in Japan, 42
shareholders filed a lawsuit ... accusing 27 current and former TEPCO directors.")
However, a total number of lawsuits filed against TEPCO are significantly less than
the lawsuits filed against the British Petroleum after the 2010 Deep-water Horizon
explosion and oil spill. See also Fukushima Victims Turn from Courts in Search for
Disaster Compensation, GREENWIRE, June 26, 2012 (The amount of litigation "is
minimal compared with the several hundred suits filed against BP PLC.").
11. Fukurai, supra note 2, at 327.
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defendants, continual reliance on the use of forced confession in
trials, and judges' uncritical attitudes toward the legitimacy of
forced confessions.12 Many Japanese and international scholars,
civic activists, and victims of wrongful convictions and their families
have been increasingly vocal.13 These initial complaints coalesced
into a substantial grassroots movement in the 1980s and 1990s and
provided the impetus to facilitate the discussions to bring back the
all-citizen jury system that was suspended by the Japanese military
government in 1943 in the midst of WWII.14 The resurrection of
citizen legal participation was seen to eliminate many of causal
factors of wrongful convictions and violation of human rights of
criminal defendants. Lay participation in Saiban-in trials was also
expected to inject citizens' critical insights and common sense
judgments into the intimate working relationship among judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
A. Saiban-in Seido (A Quasi-Jury System)
After the jury system was suspended in 1943, the resurrection
of citizens' participation system in the justice system has been the
major goal of many grassroots movements and progressive civic
activities. 15 One of five major sections of the final JSRC
recommendation was thus entirely devoted to the necessity of
establishing the new lay participation system in Japan. The JSRC's
first discussion on the creation of a lay participatory system was
held in a reference material presented by Tokyo Law Professor
Masahito Inouye in the 51st public meeting on March 13, 2001.16
12. Hiroshi Fukurai & Kaoru Kurosawa, Impact of Popular Legal Participation on
Forced Confessions and Wrongful Convictions in Japan's Bureaucratic Courtroom: A
Cross-National Analysis in the U.S. and Japan, 7 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2010).
13. Fukurai, supra note 2, at 317-20.
14. Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, What Brings People to the Courtroom?
Comparative Analysis of People's Willingness to Serve as Jurors in Japan and the U.S., 38
INT'L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 198, 200 (2010). There were also some significant anomalies
of Japan's jury system, including: (1) defendants who preferred a jury trial had to
give up rights to appeal; (2) the jury merely answered a set of interrogatories
framed by a presiding judge who could reject its findings; and (3) a jury trial was
expensive and difficult to administer. See David T. Johnson, Early Returns from
Japan's New Criminal Trials, 36 ASIAN-PAC. J. 3 (2009), available at http://
www.japanfocus.org/-DavidT--Johnson/3212.
15. Fukurai, supra note 2, at 317-20.
16. See Sosho Tetsuzuki Eno Aratana Sanka Seido Kokushi An [A New Mixed
Court System in Criminal Procedures: Suggestions for the Framework] (Mar. 13,
2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai51/51gaiyou.html.
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The term, "Saiban-in," was first coined by Inouye who explained the
need to establish the hybrid jury system with the following six
distinct characteristics: (1) a role for citizen or lay judges (i.e., Saiban-
in) in the judicial process; (2) a role for professional judges in
coordination with lay judges within the same process; (3) a
standardized method for the selection stipulation of the rights and
duties of the lay judges; (4) deliberation for final verdicts; (5) a
formal method of a trial procedure and judgment; and (6) a
appellate procedure.17
Inouye was subsequently asked to chair the Lay
Assessor/Penal Matter Investigation Committee (LAPMIC)
("Sabain-in Seido, Keiji Kentokai") to implement his own
recommendations on the hybrid court system. On January 29, 2004,
the final report was submitted at the 31st LAPMIC meeting to the
Reform Promotion Office in the Cabinet.18 On March 16, on the
basis of the LAMPIC report, the Cabinet Office completed its final
proposal entitled "Recommendation of the Justice System Reform
Council: For the Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st
Century" and submitted it to the National Diet (Japan's bicameral
legislative body equivalent to the Congress in the U.S.).19 Finally it
passed the proposal and announced that the first Saiban-in system
be implemented in May of 2009.20 The Quasi-Jury Act provides two
different panels for the criminal trial. 21 The panel of three
professional and six lay judges is selected in a contested case, 22
17. Id.
18. SAIBAN-IN SEIDo & KEIJI KENTOKAI, DAI 31-KAI, GiJI GAIYO [A "SAIBAN-IN"
SYSTEM AND PENAL INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, 31 MEETING, DiscussIoN SUMMARIES]
(an. 29, 2004), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/sai banin/
dai3l/31gaiyou.html.
19. Noboru Yanase, Saiban-in Ho no Rippo-Katei (3) [The Legislative Process
for the Establishment of the Lay Assessor Law, Part Three], 10 SHINSHU DAIGAKU
HOGAKURONSHI [SHINSHU U. L.J.] 119, 123 (2008) (reviewing the legislative history
of the Lay Assessor Act), available at https://soar-ir.shinshuu.ac.jp/dspace/handle
/10091/3875.
20. Id.
21. Saiban-in No Sanka Suru Keiji Saiban Ni Kansuru Horitsu [The Act
Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trial], Law No. 63 of 2004.
"Saiban-in Seido" is translated as the system of "the lay assessor" and/or "the
quasi-jury." See Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan's Quasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law:
An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in
Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 233, 233-35 (2004) [hereinafter Quasi-Jury
Act].
22. Quasi-Jury Act art. 2(2).
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while one professional and four lay judges are chosen in
uncontested cases where facts and issues identified by pretrial
procedure are undisputed. 23
The first Saiban-in trial took place on August 4, 2009.24 As of
May 2012, a total of 21,944 citizens had already presided as lay
judges in Saiban-in trials. The majority of these trial participants
responded positively to their experience in their trials. At the same
time, some participants were critical of the contents of trial
proceedings, such as methods and manners in which evidence was
presented in trial, undue influence of professional judges
throughout the trial, and crime victims' participation and their
emotive influence during the deliberation. These outstanding issues
will be reviewed in the latter part of this report.
B. Revised Kensatsu Shinsakai (Prosecution Review Commissions
(PR C))25
The PRC was first established in 1948 with the help of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) with the
explicit intent to curtail the extremely powerful prosecutorial
institution of the Japanese government prior to the end of WWII.26
It is, in many respects, akin to a Japanese version of the American
grand jury equipped with the specific function to review and assess
the propriety of prosecutors' indictment decisions. The PRC
consists of eleven citizens chosen randomly from local
communities. 27 Based on the evaluation of evidence, the PRC issues
prosecutors one of the following three recommendations: (1) non-
indictment is proper (i.e., the prosecutor's decision was
appropriate); (2) non-indictment is improper (i.e., the prosecutor
should reconsider the non-charge decision); and (3) indictment is
23. Id. art. 2(3).
24. See generally Makoto Ibusuki, "Quo Vadis?" First Year Inspection to Japanese
Mixed Jury Trial, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 24, 25-26 (2010).
25. The PRC is also referred as the Committee (or Commission) for the Inquest
of Prosecution (CIP).
26. Kensatsu Shinsakai Ho [Prosecution Review Commission Law], Law No.
147, art. 37 (1948) [hereinafter PRC Law]; see also Fukurai, supra note 2, at 323-28.
27. For the function, purpose, and history of the PRC, see Hiroshi Fukurai,
Japan's Quasi-Jury and Grand jury Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-
Colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy, 86 CHICAGO-KENT L. R.
789 (2011).
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proper (i.e., the prosecutor should have prosecuted the accused).28
Since nearly all indictments issued by the Japanese prosecution lead
to conviction in Japan, the PRC's ex-post facto review of the
appropriateness of nonprosecution decisions is extremely important
for checking the potential abuse of prosecutorial power.29 The near-
perfect conviction of indicted cases by the prosecution also means
that if one can somehow escape the indictment, his or her innocence
is factually established. In other words, the abuse of indictment
power by the Japanese prosecutors potentially lies in their discretion
in decisions not to prosecute potential suspects or criminals.
Nonetheless, the PRC's decision was merely regarded as an
advisory capacity.
With respect to tremendous power vested in Japan's
prosecutors, prominent American sociologist David Johnson argued
that "democratizing the procuracy was a primary Occupation
aim ... [because] prewar prosecutors had abused their power by
trampling [on] human rights ... [in order to pursue] their own
political objectives." 30 Even during the postwar era, Johnson
warned that Japanese prosecutors had gradually become even more
powerful than their American counterparts with respect to the
following four specific areas: (1) power to access pre-indictment
investigation and interrogations of suspects in substitute prisons in
conjunction with the police; (2) monopoly of power to dispose of
cases by making or dropping charge decisions, regardless of the
strength of evidence; (3) power to recommend a proper judgment
and sentencing decisions, as well as the ability to appeal acquittals;
and (4) supervision over the execution of the severity of sentences,
including death penalties imposed by the court. 31 Japan's PRC is
then expected to offer tremendous reform over these areas.
Thus, given the tremendous power of Japan's prosecutors and
people's responses to oversee the potential abuse of prosecutorial
28. PRC Law, supra note 26, art. 27.
29. Prosecutors or Persecutors: A Legal Scandal May Spark Reform of the Japanese
Judicial System, THE EcONoMIsT (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.economist. corn/node/
17259159 (Japan "has a fishily high conviction rate, at 99.9%."); see also J. Mark
Rarnseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 53, 53 (2001) ("Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent.").
30. David T. Johnson, Why the Wicked Sleep: The Prosecution of Political Corruption
in Postwar Japan (JPRI, Working Paper No. 34, 1997), http://www.jpri.
org/publications/workingpapers/wp34.htnl.
31. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 15.
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authority, the JSRC first discussed the revision of the PRC Law in its
seventh meeting on November 24, 1999.32 More detailed discussion
regarding the revision of the PRC Law took place in the 55th
meeting on April 10, 2001.33 Initially, there was no unified opinion
on the mandatory status of the PRC decisions. The reference
material submitted to the meeting showed comparisons of different
opinions and reforms suggested by 13 committee members, each
reflecting the preferred opinions by three powerful branches of
vested interest groups, including the JFBA, the Supreme Court, and
the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice recommended that
only the third resolution, "indictment is proper" should be
considered legally binding, while the Supreme Court agreed to
consider both "non-indictment is improper" and "indictment is
proper" the legally binding status.34 The JFBA's recommendation
was similar to that of the Ministry of Justice, adding that the
approval for the decision only requires two thirds of the vote.35 The
JFBA also made suggestions to create the position of a "legal
advisor" in support of the discussion and deliberation for the PRC
members and that this individual be selected from a pool of
practicing attorneys, and not from either public prosecutors or
bureaucratic judges of the Japanese government. 36
The Reform Promotion Office finally delegated the authority to
the Quasi-Jury/Penal Matter Investigation Committee. On
November 11, 2003, Committee Chair Inouye presented the
summary of the recommendation in the committee meeting,
suggesting that the PRC's decision be given legally binding status
and that the legal advisor be selected from the rank of practicing
attorneys.37 The committee finally completed its report, and on May
29, 2014, the Japanese Diet enacted the Act to Revise the Code of
32. Shihoseido Kaikaku Shingikai Dai 7 Kai Giji Gaiyo [JSRC, 7th Meeting,
Discussion Summaries] (Nov. 24, 1999), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/
991 126dai7.html.
33. Shihoseido Kaikaku Shingikai Dai 55 Kai Giji Gaiyo [JSRC, 55th Meeting,
Discussion Summaries] (Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/
dai 55/55gaiyou.html.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. KANGAERARERU KENSATSU SHINSAKAI SEIDO KAISEI NO GAIYO NI TsuITE [THE
OUTLINE ON THE PRC's REFORM TO CONSIDER] (Nov. 11, 2003),
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/saibanin/dai29/29siryoul.p
df.
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Criminal Procedure, revising the existing PRC Law.38
The revised PRC Act bestowed on the PRC the authority to
demand explanations for nonprosecution decisions and made an
indictment mandatory if the commission had already twice
recommended prosecution. The revised law established a two-step
process to make the PRC resolution legally binding. First, when the
PRC decides that an indictment is proper, prosecutors will be
obliged to reconsider the non-indictment decision, although the
commission's decision is not legally binding at that time. If
prosecutors still choose not to prosecute or if they fail to indict
within three months, prosecutors will be invited to explain their
inaction or non-indictment decision to the commission.39 Following
this, the commission will then reevaluate the case and can make a
legally binding decision in favor of an indictment. 40 In the event of
such a decision, the court must appoint a lawyer who will perform
the prosecution's role until a final ruling is reached. 41 Since only the
prosecutor has the power to indict and prosecute the accused, the
actual instruction to investigate authorities, however, will still be
entrusted with the prosecutors. 42
The court appoints a lawyer to the newly created role of legal
advisor in circumstances when the Commission needs specialized
legal advice. 43 Such a situation is likely to arise during the second
half of the two-step process - after prosecutors have rejected the
PRC's initial indictment recommendation and the Commission is
considering the prosecutor's second non-indictment decision.44
38. Keiji Soshohoto no Ichibu o Kaiseisuru Horitsu [Act to Revise the Code of Criminal
Procedure] [hereinafter PRC Act], Law No. 62 of 2004, http://law.e-
gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html.
39. PRC Act arts. 41 (2)(2) & 41 (6) (2).
40. Id. art. 41 (6) (1).
41. Id. art. 41 (9) (1).
42. Id. art. 41 (9) (3). See Mark West, Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan's
Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 697 (1992)
(stating that "because only the prosecutor has the power to indict, all PRC
recommendations were considered merely advisory and not binding," indicting
that even after the new PRC Act was passed, the prosecutor still remains authority
to provide an appointed counsel prosecutorial instructions to investigate the
accused).
43. PRC Act art. 39 (2) (1).
44. Id. art. 41 (4). It is legally "required" that the PRC acquires the assistance of
a legal advisor in considering the second resolution on the same case.
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III. Impact of Lay Adjudication on Criminal Justice
Procedures: Remedial Measures to Eliminate Procedural
Problems in the Criminal Process
This section examines how both the practice of criminal justice
and the judicial process have been affected by the introduction of
the twin systems of lay adjudication. The analysis primarily focuses
on the effect of the Saiban-in trial on the criminal justice proceedings.
While the PRC does change the ways in which prosecutors make
indictment decisions in criminal cases, it does not directly influence
trial court proceedings themselves. The impact of the PRC on the
prosecution system will be examined in the latter part of this report.
Past research has identified a multitude of causal factors that
led to the prevalence of wrongful prosecutions and convictions, and
they can be largely summarized into five distinct areas, as have been
already indicated. Practicing attorneys and legal scholars have also
identified other related factors. For example, prominent defense
attorney Shojiro Goto who has worked on many wrongful
conviction cases in his career pointed out: (1) the problem of
prosecutors' frequent use of an arrest warrant on a separate,
pretexual criminal charge in order to allow the continued
interrogation of criminal suspects; (2) manufacturing of fabricated
and falsified evidence; (3) purposeful suppression of exculpatory
evidence and destruction of proof, and (4) judges' deeply ingrained
biases and prejudices against criminal defendants.45
The following section examines whether or not the JSRC's
recommendations and proposals helped to eliminate these
outstanding problems and issues.
A. The Use of Substitute Prisons [Daiyo Kangokul
With respect to the issues relating to the custody of criminal
suspects, the JSRC report was seriously concerned about the use of
custody facilities in police stations in lieu of actual detention
facilities. The use of substitute prison has been historically
responsible for the brutal investigation of the suspect by police
and/or prosecutorial investigators for the extraction of coerced
45. SHOJIRo GoTo, ENZAI [WRONGFUL CONVICTION] 216-31 (1979). See SEIKICHI
UEDA & SHOJIRO GoTo, AYAMATTA SAIBAN [WRONGFUL TRIALS] 199-220 (1960);
CHIHIRO SAEKI, BAISHIN SAIBAN NO FuKKATSu [ RESURRECTION OF THE JURY TRIAL] 157-
63 (1996) (elaborating the problem of defendants' confessionary statement and a
summary report of interrogation by police investigators).
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confessions. 46 However, the word, "Daiyo Kangoku," appeared only
once in the JSRC recommendations, merely stating that the
"improper custody of suspects and of defendants must be prevented
and rectified." 47 The JSRC recommendation thus failed to directly
address the causal link between custodial detention and the use of
brutal interrogation techniques by investigative officers for the
forced extraction of confessions from suspects because nearly 92% of
all criminal defendants in Japan result in making confessions48
This is despite the fact that the Japanese Constitution
specifically provides a comprehensive prohibition against the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, the extraction of forced
confessions under lengthy detention, and self-incriminations.
Article 38 states that (1) "No person shall be compelled to testify
against himself," (2) "A confession made under compulsion, torture
or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be
admitted in evidence," and (3) "No person shall be convicted or
punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own
confession." 49 Similarly, Article 36 states that the "infliction of
torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely
forbidden."50 Despite the Constitutional prohibition, the legal basis
for the use of police holding cells comes from Article 1, Section 3 of
the antiquated 1908 Prison Law, which was used to allow the use of
detention cells in police stations for interrogation. This century-old
law was finally replaced by the new Criminal Detention Law [Daiyo
Keiji Shisetsu-ho] in 2006, but the new law still failed to abolish
custodial facilities themselves or even the use of facilities for
interrogation purposes. 51 While the JFBA proposed a series of
46. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 253-62. See generally SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING
IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME (1992).
47. Issues Related to Custody of Suspects and of Defendants, in JSRC REPORT,
supra note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2 (4) (2) (a).
48. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 75 (stating that "the fact that 92 percent of all
defendants confess is hardly surprising").
49. CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN [hereinafter JAPAN CONSTITUTION] art. 38. An English
translation is available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt. See also Jeff
Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human Rights Abuses in
the Japanese Penal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329, 344 n.144 (2003).
50. JAPAN CONSTITUTION art. 36.
51. JAPANESE WORKERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (JWCHR), THE HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT FOR CONVEYING THE REAL CONDITION IN JAPAN 45 (2006) (stating that
"Daiyo Kangoku continues to exist with a different name: 'Daiyo Keiji Shisetsu'
(substitute penal institute)").
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recommendations to improve the right of detained criminal suspects,
the special committee to discuss the actual content of the Criminal
Detention Law convened for mere two months, and the strong
oppositions from both the Justice Ministry and the National Police
Agency gave way to limited reforms. 52
The JSRC report also recognized that the use of custodial
facilities and detention cells in police stations purportedly helped
extend the criminal investigation and facilitate "illegal"
interrogations of criminal suspects. 53 Even with these
acknowledgements, the JSRC recommendation nonetheless failed to
eliminate the substitute prisons which continue to exist today.
To help propose new remedies to these problems, including the
elimination of the substitute prisons, a special committee was
created in 2011. It is called "the Legal Council: The Special
Committee for Criminal Justice in New Ages (SCCJNA, "Shinjidai no
Keiji-shiho Seido Tokubetsu Bukai" hereinafter the Special Committee)."
The Special Committee has 25 criminal justice experts and has
attempted to address the continued problem of substitute prisons.54
The SCCJNA Chair, Katsuhiko Honda, received a letter from
Amnesty International, asking him to eliminate the substitute prison
immediately and to introduce the use of audio and visual recording
devices at each and every phase of the investigative process.55
The problem of substitute prison was first pointed out in the
second SCCJNA meeting on July 28, 2011.56 At its fifth meeting,
Attorney Kazuko Nakayama further attributed it as the primary
52. JFBA, KoKIN NI-HOAN TAISAKU HONBU: KEIJI KOKIN SEIDO KAiKAKU JITSUGEN
HONBU No KATSUDO KEIKA [TASKFORCE FOR Two CUSTODIAL DETENTION LAWS:
ACTIVITIES OF HEADQUARTERS FOR THE PROMOTION OF CUSTODIAL DETENTION REFORMS],
Keiji Hi-Shuyosha Shogu-ho no Seiritsu [Part 3: The Passage of the Criminal
Detention Law] (2006), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/criminal/
detention/taisakuhonbu.html.
53. Issues Related to Custody of Suspects and of Defendants, in JSRC REPORT, supra,
note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2 (4) (2) (a) ("Various concerns have been pointed out regarding
the custody of suspects and of defendants, such as how daiyo kangoku (use of
custody facilities in police stations in lieu of detention facilities) should be.")
54. Meibo [The Special Committee, Membership] (une 22, 2012), http://
www.moj. go.jp/content/000099259.pdf.
55. Catherine Barber, Kokai Shokan [Open Letter of the Amnesty International]
(June 2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA22/010/2012/ja/
fdf52fbd-fac4-4fb9-b5de-e869a2c88904/asa220102012ja.pdf.
56. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, The Special Committee (July 28, 2011), http://www.moj.
go.jp/kentou/jimu/kentou0l_00041.html.
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cause of wrongful convictions in the past; she insisted the complete
elimination of substitute prison on November 29, 2011.57 The
committee discussions still continue today, though it is safe to say
that the government opposition, particularly, from the Ministry of
Justice and the National Police Agency stands firmly against the
complete elimination of interrogative facilities in Japan.
B. Limited Access to Defense Counsel
The JSRC report suggested the importance of establishing a
systematic process to ensure "sufficient meetings between suspects
and defense counsel" during the criminal process. 5 8 While the
public defense counsel for individuals who have no legal counsel is
disallowed by the government until after an indictment, the JSRC
recommendation promulgated the Act to Amend the Criminal
Proceedings [Keiji Sosho-ho-to Ichibu Kaisei-ho] in May 2004 and
establish a National Public Defender System [Higisha Kokusen Bengo
Seido]. The new law allows the indigent to obtain defense counsel
during the pre-indictment stage of the criminal process.59 Through
the JSRC recommendation, a systematic process for ensuring
sufficient meetings between indigent suspects and defense counsel
during the criminal process has been sufficiently established.
The JFBA had previously established a free attorney-on-duty
service [Toban Bengoshi Seido] for detained suspects, but the scope of
its services has been quite limited. The Japan Legal Support Center
(JLSC or "Hoterasu") was established in 2006 to provide basic legal
support to criminal defendants. However, only those whose total
net wealth, including cash and bank accounts, does not exceed a half
million yen ($6,000) are allowed to access legal services of a public
defense lawyer. 60
57. THE LEGAL COUNCIL, Hosei Shingikai, Shin-jidai no Keiji-Shiho Seido
Tokubetsu Bukai: Dai 5-Kai Kaigi, Gijiroku [The Special Committee for Criminal Justice
in New Ages: The Minutes of the Council Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting] (Nov. 29,
2011), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000 084 089 .pdf.
58. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. 2, Pt. 2 (4) (2) (b) ("With Regard to Measures
to Ensure the Propriety of Questioning of Suspects").
59. See the following governmental site for the content of the Act, http://www.
kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/hourei/keiji.html. The English version of the Act is
available at http://www.houterasu.or.jp/cont/10016 745 0.pdf.
60. Those whose net worth exceeds a half million yen can file a petition to a
local bar association to acquire a lawyer. For some reason, if the lawyer was unable
to represent the client, he/she can file a petition to the JLSC to acquire a public
defender. For the explanation of the detailed procedure for the acquisition of a
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Nonetheless, recent government statistics showed a dramatic
increase in the number of defense counsels since the start of the
Saiban-in trial in 2009. In 2007 and 2008, a total of 140,271 and
133,412 defendants received detention warrants respectively, while
a little more than 6,000 defendants were able to secure court-
appointed attorneys. After the introduction of Saiban-in trials in
2009, the number of court-appointed attorneys for criminal
defendants increased to 46,666 in 2010 and 70,618 in 2011, despite
the fact that less numbers of detention warrants were issued in the
latter two years combined than the previous two years. 61
C. Use of Physical and Psychological Torture to Obtain Forced
Confessions
Japanese investigators have historically considered the direct
questioning of suspected criminals as more important and efficient
than the process of conducting searches and seizures for evidence.62
Thus, in practice, the use of psychological and physical tortures has
been an accepted norm and became carefully systematic means of
obtaining confessions. The JSRC recommendations have attempted
to address the problem, and while some changes have been
implemented, there has not been pervasive and effective reform. So
despite some progress, the use of recording devices was still not
allowed in police detention cells, where an overwhelming majority
of alleged physical and psychological tortures take place. 63
Until the end of the Tokugawa Period in 1868, various methods
of torture were prescribed by law, and both torture and coerced
confessions were considered an integral part of the criminal justice
system.64 The value of confession was considered not only as
court-appointed attorney, even in situations where one's financial wealth exceeds ahalf million yen, please see the homepage of the Kyoto Daiichi Horitsu Jimusho[Kyoto Daiichi Law Office], http://www.daiichi.gr.jp/publication/johobox/2006
/091.html.
61. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Higisha Kokusen Bengo Seido no Tokei Shiryo [Statistics for
the National 'Public Defender System] (2011), http://www.moj.go.jp/content
/000100782.pdf.
62. GOTo, supra note 45. See also TOSHIKI ODANAKA, ENZAI WA KOSHITE
TSUKURARERU [IN THE MAKING OF THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES] (1993).
63. HUMAN RIGHTS Now, HRN to Organize a Conference with JFBA on
Transparency of Police Investigation (Aug. 16, 2012), http://hm.or.jp/eng/activity/
area/japan/hrn-to-organize-a-conference-with-jfba-on-transparency-of-police-
investigation/.
64. Rajendra Ramlogan, The Human Rights Revolution in Japan: A Story of New
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evidentiary, but also redemptory because those who confessed
could expect more lenient treatment.65
After the establishment of the modem state, the Japanese
government decided to abolish torture as a principal means of
soliciting confessions in 1879; however, today's investigators still
rely on the use of psychological and physical torture, including
intimidation and physical abuse, to extract confessions from
detained suspects. 66 Police and prosecutorial reliance on physical
and psychological violence to obtain confessions has long been
criticized by both the Japanese public and the broader international
human rights community because of the systematic disregards and
abuses of the accused's human rights. While there are no clear
statistics on the prevalence of the use of torture for obtaining
confessions, Professor Toshikuni Murai estimated that, among all of
voluntary and/or extraneously coerced confessions by criminal
suspects and defendants in Japan, coerced and forced confessions
could account for as high as fifty percent of all confession cases in
Japan. 67 Historians, however, have argued that the prohibition
against the use of torture is relatively new to Japan, arguing that the
historical legacy of mistreating criminal suspects still largely
prevails in the penal system, and an impasse exists that prevents the
enactment of international human rights laws within Japan.68
Japan's courts have rarely overturned convictions on the basis
of torture or inhumane treatment. From 1952 to the early 1990s, for
example, over 12,000 complaints of torture and similar inhumane
abuses were reported. However, only 15 cases were accepted by the
courts, and only eight resulted in the punishment of police. 69 On
one level, proving torture has been extremely difficult given the
closed nature of the interrogation in substitute prisons. In order to
make the investigative process more open and transparent, in July
2006, prosecutors began implementing the use of video-recording
Wine in Old Wine Skins?, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 127, 181-99 (1994).
65. Id. at 198-99.
66. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80
CALIF. L. REV. 317, 330 (1992).
67. Teresa Watanabe, Victims of a Safe Society: Behind Japan's Low Crime Rate and
Civilized Streets is a Criminal Justice System Criticized as the Most Backward in the
Industrialized World, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1992, at Al.
68. Vize, supra note 49, at 343.
69. Ramlogan, supra note 64, at 182.
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devices during their interrogations.70 However, the recording was
only applied to a very small number of criminal cases and was only
limited to interrogations conducted by the Tokyo Prosecutors'
Office. 71 In February 2007, a similar practice of recording
interrogations was extended to eight regional prosecutorial offices.
However, the recording was still limited to only 170 of all the
criminal cases. 72 The Japanese police began recording the
questioning of suspects in 2009 and prosecutors did so in 2011 on a
test basis only.73 In July 2012, the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office
announced that some "elite" prosecutors used a recording device in
all or part of their interrogation sessions during a pilot project
nationwide; most of these recorded cases involved the violation of
tax law and financial regulations, and not violent and serious
criminal offenses.74
Japan has so far signed two key international treaties governing
abuses in prisons and detention centers, namely the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which was ratified
in 197975 and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), to which Japan
acceded in 1999.76 Despite the signing of these international treaties,
Japan continues to solicit confessions obtained through physical
duress and/or psychological pressure, and safeguards against
torture and self-incrimination have been systematically ignored.
Prominent legal scholar Stephen Thaman suggested a different
70. Shinya Sakane, Torishirabe no Kashika ni Mukete [Towards the Transparency of
Investigative Processes], 6 LIBRA 26 (2006), available at http://www.toben.or.jp/
message/libra/pdf/2006_09/p26p27_RASINBAN.pdf.
71. Id.
72. JFBA, Torishirabe no Rokuon Rokuga no Shiko ni Tsuiteno Kenshokekka ni
Taisuru Ikensho [Opinion for the Investigative Results on the Trial of Audio-Visual
Recording Devices during Interrogation] (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.nichibenren.or.
jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/090318_3.pdf.
73. Man Given Jail Term After Entire Questioning Process Videotaped, JAPAN
ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, Feb. 24, 2012.
74. Prosecutors Record Most Interrogations During Own Investigations, JAPAN
ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, July 4, 2012.
75. See generally GLOBAL RIGHTS PARTNERS FOR JUSTICE, The Violations of the Rights
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in Japan: A Shadow Report (Oct.
2008), at 2, available at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/Shadow-
Report_Japan.pdf?doclD=10043.
76. JFBA, Report on the Japanese Government's Implementation of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Uan.
18, 2007), at 1, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/
ngos/JFBA.pdf.
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strategy for ensuring greater transparency in investigative processes
via the adoption of the new codes of criminal procedure. According
to Professor Thaman, Italy and Venezuela have both adopted new
laws that require defense counsel to be present during an
interrogation for any of the evidence obtained during it to be
admissible in court2' The U.S. Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois
also ruled that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during
police interrogation, stating that law enforcement "which comes to
depend on the confession will, in the long run, be less reliable and
more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." 78
Prominent Japanese legal writer Chihiro Isa similarly argued that
the over-reliance on the confessionary evidence leads to diminished
investigative efforts from the police and prosecutors to properly
seek and obtain material, forensic, and/or other corroborating
evidence. 79 Instead, such investigative methods and overreliance on
confessions may often lead to more instances of wrongful
convictions.80
The JSRC recommendations, on the other hand, have generally
failed to closely scrutinize Japanese investigative methods and the
pervasive use of confession in Japanese courts. The word,
"confession" or "Jihaku," was used only twice in the JSRC's
comprehensive report - in a section with the subheading, "With
Regard to Measures to Ensure the Propriety of Questioning of
Suspects." The report gave a basic treatment of the issue, stating
that the use of "questioning lacks propriety, arising out of an
excessive emphasis on confessions of suspects ... [and] questioning
of suspects must not be improper, and measures to prevent
improper questioning naturally are necessary." 8'
Between 2007 and 2009, however, in an effort to respond to
both domestic and international pressure, the Japanese government
made some effort to promulgate a transparency law that would
shed light on the criminal investigative process; but, their efforts
77. Stephen Thaman, Japan's New System of Mixed Courts: Some Suggestions
Regarding Their Future Form and Procedures, 2001 ST. Louis-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 89, 105 (2001-02).
78. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
79. CHIHIRO ISA, SHIHO NO HANZAI [CRIMES BY THE JUDICIARY] (2006).
80. Id.
81. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. 2, Pt. 2 (4) (2) (b) ("With Regard to Measures
to Ensure the Propriety of Questioning of Suspects").
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have been systematically undermined either through the denial of
the proposal by the upper house of the Diet or through the
dissolution of the Diet even after both upper and lower houses gave
prior approval. 82 In October 2009, the government also created a
standing committee on judicial affairs and submitted an interim
report on the committee resolutions in June 2010.83 In February of
2010, the National Police Agency also convened a study group to
examine the sophistication of investigative methods under the
leadership of the chairman of the National Public Safety
Commission, resulting in a voluntary introduction of a recording
device in a limited number of interrogation sessions.84
Given recent controversies with the falsification of floppy data
by the Chief and Deputy Directors at the Special Investigation
Division of the Osaka Prosecutor's Office in 2010, the Supreme
Court submitted the report on the falsification incident on December
24, 2010, suggesting the measures to introduce the transparency in
investigative processes and restore the reputable status of the public
prosecutors and their offices.85 In this case, three prosecutors were
indicted over the intentional tempering of data on a floppy disk in
the course of their investigation into alleged abuse of Japan's postal
discount system.86 Another study group which was created by the
Minister of Justice submitted a report on March 31, 2011, reiterating
the importance of introducing transparency into investigative
processes by public prosecutors.87 Following this, former Justice
Minister Satsuki Eda ordered the introduction of the audio-visual
recording during suspect investigation and interrogation and, by
September 2011, the use of recording devices were applied to 31
82. Seiichi Hishinuma, Homu linkai no Shuyo Kadai: Shihoseido Kaikaku Shingikai
Ikensho Kara 10-Nen [Main Themes of the Standing Committee on Judicial Affairs: Ten
Years from the Recommendations of the JSRC], 324 RIPPO TO CHOSA 24, 30 (2012).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. JAPAN SUPREME COURT, Iwayuru Korosho Moto Kyokucho Muzai liken ni Okeru
Sosa, Kohan Katsudo no Mondaiten-to ni Tsuite [Regarding the Problems of the
Investigation and Trial Proceedings of the Case Involving the Innocence of the Chief
Director of the Ministry of Health and Welfare] (Dec. 2010), http://www.
moj.go.jp/content/000076308.pdf.
86. Top Prosecutor to Quit Over Scandal, JAPAN TIMEs (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20101217a7.html.
87. MINISTRY OF JusricE, Kensatsu no Saisei ni Mukete [Restoring the Integrity of the
Prosecutor's Office] (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000076299.pdf.
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criminal defendants in 247 cases.88 While the Japanese executive
office have made some notable efforts, neither a concrete law or a set
of new regulations has yet to be promulgated nor adopted to
increase the transparency in the Japanese criminal justice system.
The SCCJNA is thus currently assessing the proper investigative
method to be used by the police and prosecutors and discussing the
possible introduction of the recording device at each and every
investigative process. 89
D. Judicial Neglect Over the Use of Confession Documents and
Other Written Materials
In addition to the fact that the criminal process still lacks
effective oversight to prevent the extraction of forced confessions
from criminal suspects or defendants, scholars have also pointed to
the attitudes of Japanese judges as contributing to the problem.
Senshu University Law Professor Toshiki Odanaka has pointed out
that four features underlying the indifference and negligence of
Japanese judges may lead to wrongful convictions in Japan. They
are: (1) disregard of the fairness of criminal investigative processes,
(2) indifference toward circumstances and conditions surrounding
the suspect when soliciting confessions, (3) uncritical attitudes
toward the credibility and authenticity of confessions and expert
opinions, and (4) indifference toward possible internal
contradictions of narratives provided by coerced confessions. 90
Kwanzei University Law Professor Takashi Maruta also stated
that Japanese judges' systemic disregard for the rights of the
accused and near-blind acceptance of confession as the queen of all
evidence may stem from their homogenous social origins and legal
trainings they have received, as well as the stringent bureaucratic
control exerted by the Secretariat of the Supreme Court. 91 He argues
that judges are not independent thinkers when it comes to making
legal decisions and writing legal opinions.
Judges in Japanese courts were all children of the same type of
high-income parents, all studied at the same leading high schools,
went to the same bar exam preparatory schools, graduated from
88. Hishinuma, supra note 82, at 31.
89. See the following government site for the committee proceedings,
http://www.moj.go.jp/shingil/shingi03500012.html.
90. ODANAKA, supra note 62.
91. TAKASHI MARUTA, SAIBAN'IN SEIDO [THE QUASI-JURY SYSTEM] 43 (2004).
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the same universities, studied at the same [legal] training institute
and, without ever experiencing any other profession, spend most
of their lives in court with colleagues who all share the same
mode of thinking. 92
Professor Maruta also suggests that Japanese judges have very
little autonomy or judicial independence, as they are subject to
reappointment every ten years and may be reassigned to different
courts in remote regions in Japan. The threat of denying
reappointment and the "shipping" of noncompliant judges to far
away "satellite" courthouses has effectively been used by the
Secretariat of the Supreme Court to ensure that judges follow
standardized procedures, efficiently manage their case loads, and
issue opinions that do not challenge the court's legal status quo and
precedents. Japanese judges who fail to skillfully dispose a large
number of criminal cases become subject to negative and critical
evaluations by the Supreme Court in periodic merit and promotion
considerations. 93 The Secretariat's critical evaluations of, and strict
bureaucratic control over, the Japanese judge thus helped
standardize the court's opinions, control ideologies of individual
judges, and promote efficient bureaucratic dispositions of a large
number of criminal and civil cases. This is despite the fact that
judges' complete independence has been guaranteed under Article
78 of the Japanese Constitution, which states that "Judges shall not
be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially
declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official
duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered
by any executive organ or agency." 94
The JSRC suggested the introduction of transparency and
accountability into the evaluation and assessment of judicial
candidates for appointment and personnel process for the merit and
reappointment procedures. Under the section title of the
92. Id. The excerpt (i.e., the translation of Maruta's original quote) was taken
from Colin P.A. Jones, Book Review: Prospects for Citizen Participation in Criminal
Trials in Japan, 15 PAC. RIM L. & PO'Y J. 363, 364 (2006).
93. TAKASHI MARUTA, BAISHIN SAIBAN o KANGAERU [CONSIDERING THE JURY
TRIAL] (1990).
94. JAPAN CONSTITUTION art. 78. For the discussion of the independence of
Japan's judiciary, please see Takayuki Ii, Japan's Judicial System May Change, but Its
Fundamental Nature Stays Virtually the Same? Recent Japanese Reforms on the Judicial
Appointment and Evaluation, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 459 (2013) (included
in this special issue of HICLR).
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"Reexamination of the Personnel System for Judges (Securing
Transparency, Objectivity)" in the JSRC's final report, the reform
council pointed out that "personnel evaluation that serves as the
basis for the personnel management lacks transparency and
objectivity ... [and] appropriate mechanisms should be established
for the purpose of ensuring, as much as possible, transparency and
objectivity with regard to the personnel evaluation of judges, by
making clear and transparent who should be the evaluator and the
standards for evaluation." 95
After the JSRC made the recommendation to reform the judge
system in 2001, the Investigation Committee on the Legal
Professional System [Hoso Seido Kento-Kai] was created by the
Reform Promotion Office, and the Supreme Court, based on the
committee report, created the "Rule on the Lower Court Judges
Nominating Advisory Commission" on February 12,2003.96
With the introduction of new rules into the nomination process,
more than 500 new judges were added to the judiciary by 2010.97 At
the same time, the new system which appoints judges from the rank
of practicing attorneys has not functioned as initially expected. 98
Despite the effort to increase the size of the judiciary, only a handful
of nominations came from practicing attorneys. In 2003, when 11
attorneys were nominated, four were found to be "not qualified,"
and only seven were accepted as judges. 99 At the same time, 109
graduates from the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI) of
the Supreme Court were nominated and 101 of them were accepted
as qualified judges. 100 In 2009, while 106 LTRI graduates qualified
as judges, only 1 attorney was accepted as a qualified judge.101
The lack of diversity among Japan's judges and their applicants,
and the still relatively small size of the Japanese judiciary, did not
help lessen the significant workload of average judges, affecting the
95. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. 3, Pt. 5 (3) ("Reexamination of the Personnel
System for Judges (Securing Transparency, Objectivity)").
96. Takayuki li, Japanese Way of Judicial Appointment and Its Impact on Judicial
Review, 5 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REv. 73, 94 (2010).
97. Shunsuke Marushima, Historical Genealogy of Japan's Judicial Reform: Its
Achievements and Challenges, 2012, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 349 (2013)
(included in this edition of HICLR).
98. Id.
99. li, supra note 96, at 98 (see Table 2).
100. Id.
101. Id.
2013]1 539
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
nature of Saiban-in trials themselves. Consequently, as the Saiban-in
trials progressed, trial judges began to allow the reading of
investigative materials and in-court recitation of confessionary
statements, instead of creating the opportunity to directly question
the defendants, witnesses, investigators, or other relevant personnel
involved in the investigation of criminal cases in court. Since these
investigative materials and confessionary statements have been
specifically written and prepared by police and/or prosecutorial
investigators, they were often accused of inaccurately reflecting the
contents of actual statements made by the accused or witnesses. 0 2
These emerging trends in Saiban-in trials seem to resemble the
over-reliance on the use of written dossiers in collegial bench trials
prior to the introduction of Saiban-in trials in 2009. The Supreme
Court reported in May 2012 that for criminal trials convened from
January to June in 2011, in which defendants already admitted their
guilt, in-court readings of investigative materials took twice as long
as the actual questioning of the defendants themselves. 0 3 One
Saiban-in judge who participated in a murder trial stated that
"Reading of investigative records went on and on and it was
extremely difficult to understand their contents. I wish that I was
able to pose direct questions." 04
The Supreme Court also found that the in-court recitation of
investigative records and the direct questioning of defendants
themselves each comprised 37% and 28% of the trial proceedings,
respectively. 05 At the Kobe District Court, the reading of written
records occupied nearly a half of the trials themselves (46%), while
the direct questions of defendants was mere 21% of the entire trial
proceeding.106 The ratio of reading records vis-a-vis questioning
defendants in Saiban-in trials improved somewhat in 2012.107 But
102. Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS
261, 265 (1999) ("This practice is problematic because the manner of speech and
demeanor of witnesses and of the defendant can have a strong influence on the
finder of fact; if these elements are not fully considered, the defendant may not be
receiving a fair trial.")
103. Shigeyuki Maekawa, Jihaku Jiken no Saiban-in Saiban: Shomen Yomiage
Chojikan-ni [Saiban-in Trials in Admitted Criminal Cases: Long Hours of Reading
Investigative Materials], KOBE SHIMBUN (May 22, 2012), http://www.kobe-
np.co.jp/news/shakai/0005073072.shtml.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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significant changes still need to be made to reverse the trend in the
direct recitation of investigative records and materials from the
court proceeding.
E. Limited Pretrial Release for the Accused
Another major problem in Japan's criminal proceeding is the
lack of pretrial release of the accused. There has largely been no
post-indictment bail system or pre-indictment release system in
Japan. Requests for pre-indictment bail are universally rejected on
the ground that no such program exists, suggesting that the suspect
is not entitled to bail during the "mandatory" or "pre-indictment"
23-day detention period. This is contrary to Article 89 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which states that post-indictment bail is
possible in Japan. 08 There are, however, many grounds on which a
judge may deny such a bail request by criminal suspects. Post-
indictment bail thus becomes extremely difficult to obtain, and
approximately 80% of the indicted await trial while in custody. 09
According to the JFBA report in 1996, only 16.3% of defendants
were released on bail. 10 The report argues that denials of charges or
remaining silent are taken as indications of the defendants' tendency
to destroy evidence which serves as the basis for denying bail."' As
a result, Japanese judges tend to give greater weight to
recommendations by prosecutors in comparison to requests by
defendants and their defense counsel.
Given the fact that access to defense counsel is incredibly
limited and pre-indictment release is impossible, today's defense
lawyers tend to recommend that the suspect remain completely
silent in custody and not engage in any conversation with police or
prosecution investigators. Because Japan does not have its own
equivalent set of Miranda Rights, where criminal suspects in police
custody are informed of his/her rights, a movement to
systematically popularize the use of Miranda warnings was
introduced by a group of progressive lawyers to encourage
defendants to remain silent in substitute prisons or under any other
108. See JAPANESE FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, ALTERNATIVE REPORT TO THE
FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF JAPAN ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 57 (Sept. 1998).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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custodial situation.112 Attorney Takashi Takano, who created the
Miranda no Kai (The Miranda Association), has shown that his
group's efforts and strategies have been very successful. For
example, prosecutors decided not to indict more than 90% of that
group's clients despite their complete silence in custody.113
To bolster its argument for pre-indictment or pretrial release for
criminal suspects or defendants, the JSRC cited the recommendation
of the UN Human Rights Committee as the basis for the possible
establishment of the pre-indictment bail system [Kisomae Hoshaku
Seido].114 The council recommendation also pointed out the problem
with the issuance of warrants, as well as the uncertainties around
how the judges' decisions for the request for the defendant's post-
indictment release on bail were made in order to reduce improper
custody of defendants in substitute prisons.115 As of today, the pre-
indictment bail system has yet to be established in Japan. Current
JFBA President Keishi Yamagishi, in his speech at the Japan
National Press Club, emphasized that it is imperative for Japan to
establish a pre-indictment bail system in order to eliminate the
ongoing use of substitute prisons and lengthy detentions of criminal
suspects or defendants without representation by effective defense
counsel. 116
Former JFBA Secretary-General Shunsuke Marushima reported
at the UC Hastings Symposium that there has been an increase in
the rate of court dismissals of detention requests by prosecutors, as
well as an increased admissions of "quasi-complaints against the
112. Takashi Takano, The Miranda Experience in Japan, in THE JAPANESE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 128-39 (Malcolm K. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds.
2002).
113. See HENSHUSHA NO KOE [Editor's Voice], Miranda no Kai [The Miranda
Association], http://mirandanokai.net/body/news/hitokoto.html ("Koremade
miranda-ho-shiki no bengo katsudo o yatta hinin jiken no 9wari-ijo wa fukiso ni
natteiru" ["In more than 90% of contested criminal cases where we applied
Miranda warnings - asking the suspect to remain silent in custody - prosecutors
failed to issue indictments."].
114. Id.
115. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2, (4) (2) (a) ("Issues Related to
Custody of Suspects and of Defendants").
116. Kenji Yamagishi, Keiji Shiho Kaikaku eno Torikumi to Higashi Nihon Daishinsai,
Genpatsujiko no Hisaisha, Higaisha eno Hoteki Shien [Strategies for Criminal Justice
Reforms and Legal Assistance to Victims of East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Accidents]
(June 19, 2012), http://www.jnpc.or.jp/files/2012/06/542922f8dd20192de70171
b40e9838da.pdf.
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use of detention [Jun Ko-koku]" filed by defense attorneys.117 Indeed,
government statistics show a steady increase in the rate of the
court's denial of detention requests by prosecution since 2003.118 In
2008, one year before the start of the Saiban-in trial, the rate of
dismissal was 0.77% which was trivial. It rose to 1.32% in 2010119
and then 1.45% in 2011.120 While the increase is still trivial, the
court's denial of detention request gives defendants better access to
effective legal counseling.
F. Pretrial Conference Procedures [Kohanmae Seiri Tetsuzuki]
The JSRC proposed the introduction of a new pretrial
conference procedure "in order to sort out the contested issues and
to fix a clear plan for the proceedings in advance of the first trial
date." 121 The recommendation also stated the importance of
introducing a discovery procedure, suggesting that "rules regarding
the timing and the scope of the disclosure of evidence should be
clearly set forth by law, and ... the need for the disclosure of
evidence should be introduced as part of the new preparatory
procedure."'
Despite a seemingly smooth and seamless transition from
inquisitorial legal proceedings to an open adversarial trial, the
introduction of a pretrial conference procedure seemed to have
become one of the significant drawbacks that prevented the smooth
disposition of a large number of expected citizen judge trials. The
total number of Saiban-in trials for the first year, for example, failed
to reach the desired goal set by the Japanese government, which
initially expected to hold around 3,000 quasi-jury trials annually. 123
117. Marushima, supra note 97.
118. Hanzai Hakusho, 2010-nen Ban [The White Paper on Crimes in 2010], at 12
(2010), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000010214.pdf.
119. Keiji Jiken, 2020 nen-do [Criminal Cases in 2010], Dai 15 hyo: Reijo Jiken no
Kekka [Results of Arrest Warrant], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei
/nenpo/pdf/B22DKEl15-16.pdf. There were 124,045 detention requests and 1,648
of them were denied.
120. Keiji Jiken, 2021 nen-do [Criminal Cases in 2012], Dai 15 hyo: Reijo Jiken no
Kekka [Results of Arrest Warrant], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/sihotokei
/nenpo/pdf/B23DKEl15-16.pdf. There were 119,110 detention requests and 1,727
of them were denied.
121. JSRC REPORT supra note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2 (1) (1) ("Introduction of New
Preparatory Procedure").
122. Id.
123. Japanese Court Office, Saiban-in Seido no Taisho to Naru Jiken no Kazu, 2008
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In the first year of the operation, the actual number of quasi-jury
trials was approximately 40% less than the anticipated numbers,
and the number of completed jury trials was a fraction of the total
number of criminal cases originally assigned to lay adjudication by
the Japanese government. 12 4 Thus, in order to process a large
number of Saiban-in trials, it may be necessary to set up an efficient
system of pretrial conference procedures.
Prior to the passage of the pretrial conference procedure law in
2004, 125 Japan's discovery laws only required that prosecutors
disclose materials or statements that they planned to introduce into
evidence at trial. 126 Thus, Japanese prosecutors had not been
required to disclose contradictory statements or confessions from
defendants or witnesses that might reveal weaknesses in their
cases. 127
The newly introduced pretrial conference forced the
prosecution to disclose much broader evidence to defense lawyers,
and courts also showed a tendency to support extensive evidence
discovery - demanding greater prosecutorial disclosure of records
and information, including discretionary work used for issuing
indictments against criminal defendants.128 While the new pretrial
conference was also introduced with the intention of saving time by
narrowing case-specific issues at trial and facilitating the speedy
trial process, the retrial procedure also forced both parties to clarify
the charges and applicable laws, define allegations and contested
issues, delineate greater disclosures of facts and evidence, establish
objections related to evidence, address the use of experts if any, and
[Criminal Cases Qualified for the Quasi-Jury Trial, 2008] (Aug. 26, 2008),
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/shiryo/pdf/03.pdf.
124. A total of 554 cases were completed by the end of May 2010.
125. KEIJI SOSHO Ho [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 316-2.
126. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 40-41.
127. Id.
128. Ibusuki, supra note 24, at 56 & n.90 ("The recent Supreme Court's judgments
suggest the disclosure to be favorable for the defense.") The expansive discovery
requests in the pretrial conference were also noted by the JFBA's report, resulting in
a long waiting period. Nonetheless, despite the long waiting list for Saiban-in trials,
the JFBA supports the thorough pretrial procedures, including greater disclosure of
evidence. See JFBA, Comment on the 1st Anniversary of the Saiban-in System (May 21,
2010), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/statement/year/2010/
100521.html. ("A [more] sufficient period of [pretrial conference] time must be
secured for preparation of a defense.")
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finally determine hearing and trial dates. 129 As a result, the
preparation phase of the new mandatory pretrial arrangement
procedure began to take many months.
For instance, during the first year of its operation, the average
length of a pretrial conference procedure was 4.2 months (4.0
months for uncontested cases and 4.8 months for contested cases).130
After three years of operation, the average length of pretrial
conference was extended to 5.7 months overall, with 4.7 months for
uncontested cases and 7.1 month for contested cases.13'
Only a quarter of pretrial procedures lasted more than four
months (28.8%) in the first year.132 After three years, 64% of pretrial
conference lasted four months or beyond.133 For the contested cases,
nearly half of them required more than four months to complete the
pretrial arrangement procedure (45.8%) in the first year.134 But, after
three years of operation, 83.1% of contested cases needed the
pretrial conference of four months and longer. 135
The procedural disparity is also reflected on the number of
procedural meetings that the pretrial conference required. The
average pretrial conference required 3.7 meetings, i.e., 3.3 meetings
for uncontested and 4.5 meetings for contested cases. 3 6 After three
years of operation, the average meetings extended to four times
overall, with 3.5 for uncontested cases and 4.8 times for contested
cases. 37
The lengthy pretrial conference procedure also affected the
overall facilitation of the lay justice process. For instance, the
average procedural period from the initial indictment to judgment
129. KEIJI SOSHO Ho art. 316-5.
130. JAPANESE COURT OFFICE, Saiban-in Saiban no Jisshi Jokyo ni Tsuite: Tokubetsu
Shukei Shiryo [Implementation of the Quasi-Jury Trial: Special Statistical Summaries]
[hereinafter Statistics-2010] (April 2010), http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/
about/iinkai/saibanin-kondan/siryo_07/pdf/siryo_5.pdf.
131. JAPANESE COURT OFFICE, Saiban-in Saiban no Jisshi Jokyo ni Tsuite: Tokubetsu
Shukei Shiryo [Implementation of the Quasi-Jury Trial: Special Statistical Summaries]
[hereinafter Statistics-2012] (March 2012), available at http://www.saibanin.courts.
go.jp/topics/pdf/saibanin-kekka.pdf.
132. Id. at Table 9.
133. Id.
134. Statistics-2010, supra note 130, at Table 9.
135. Statistics-2012, supra note 131, at Table 9.
136. Statistics-2010, supra note 130, at Table 10.
137. Statistics-2012, supra note 131, at Table 10.
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was approximately 6 months, i.e., 5.8 months in uncontested cases
and 6.8 months in contested cases. 138 Out of the 308 cases examined
by the Supreme Court Office, two-thirds of them (206 or 67%)
completed the entire criminal process from indictment to the
judgment within six months.139 Nonetheless, the remaining one
third took more than six months, including some criminal cases
which required more than a year to complete.140
These figures suggest that, for the first year, in the average of
six months from the indictment to the judgment, four months (two-
thirds) were spent on the pretrial conference procedure alone. Once
the lengthy pretrial conference is over, the criminal case itself was
expedited to complete within two months to reach a final judgment
by the Saiban-in panel.
Hence, in order to process a large number of the Saiban-in trials
as projected by the Japanese government and to provide
participatory opportunities to many Japanese citizens, it may be
necessary to shorten the lengthy preparatory period of the pretrial
conference procedure. At present, this lengthy pretrial preparation
has contributed to a significant delay in the overall adjudication of
criminal trials. While the pretrial conference arrangement may be
able to prevent an innocent person from unnecessary prosecution
and provide him/her with much needed legal protection, a more
elaborate, yet efficient system needs to be adopted in the future
operation of the Saiban-in trial.
G. Institution of the National Public Defender System and Japan
Legal Support Center
The JSRC emphasized in 2001 that a new legal support
organization had to be created in order to "manage the public
defense system [which] should be fair and independent, and public
money should be introduced for [the] operation of the system
through a proper mechanism."141
The Japan Legal Support Center (JLSC) was established on
April 10, 2006 and began its operation on October 2, 2006. The
National Public Defender System (NPDS) was also established
138. Id. at Table 11 (1).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2, (1) (b) ("How the Concrete System
Should be Introduced").
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within the JLSC in October 2006 and provides legal services related
to the court-appointed defense lawyers. At the first phase of
introducing the national public defender system, the criminal cases
available to the NPDS only included the most serious and violent
offenses that were under consideration of the death penalty. 142 In
May 2010, applicable cases were extended to other crimes with
punishment of three years' incarceration or more.143
According to David T. Johnson, approximately two-thirds of
criminal defendants in Japan were represented by state-appointed
defense lawyers.144 While the number of court-appointed defense
lawyers in 2006 was 10,733, use of the system increased
exponentially so that that number reached nearly 20,000 in 2010 (i.e.,
19,566).145 The number of requests for national public defender
services by criminal defendants in the post-indictment stage also
increased accordingly from 37,717 in 2006 to 69,634 in 2010, and the
number of requests for legal representation in the pre-indictment
stage multiplied from a mere 3,436 in 2006 to 70, 917 in 2010, more
than a 20-fold increase in just four years.146
The number of regional centers that provide legal services also
increased from 6 in 2006 to 29 in 2010, simultaneously adding more
staff attorneys from 24 in 2006 to 217 in 2010, as part of executing
the JFBA's stated mission of providing competent legal services to
people in remote areas in Japan. 147 The salary of the court-
appointed defense lawyers also increased substantially following
the introduction of the National Public Defender System in 2006.
Attorney Shunsuke Marushima who served as Senior Staff of the
JSRC Secretariat stated that demands for higher attorney fees and
more rewarding salary structures proposed by the JFBA for the
National Public Defender System were accepted by the Ministry of
142. Ministry of Justice, Higisha Kokusen Bengo Seido no Gaiyo [Summary of
the National Public Defender System], available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/
000100781.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Johnson, supra note 14 ("About two-thirds of criminal defendants in Japan
are represented by state-appointed attorneys [kokusen bengonin].").
145. JFBA, Hosojinko Seisaku ni Kansuru Kinkyu Teigen [Urgent Suggestions to the
Changes in Legal Professionals] (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nichibenren.or.jp
/library/ja/opinion/report/data/110327shiryou.pdf.
146. Id.
147. THE JAPAN LEGAL SUPPORT CENTER (JLSC), Ho TERASU TOKEI NENHO: HEISEI
22-NENDOBAN [THE JLSC ANNUAL REPORT: THE YEAR 2010], 54 (2011), available at
www.houterasu.or.jp/cont/100 453 223 .pdf.
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Finance after careful research by the bar association.148
The JFBA suggested that the court-appointed defense lawyer be
paid 365,800 yen (approximately $4,570) 149 for defending one
defendant in a Saiban-in trial with two pretrial conference hearings
and seven hours of trial work over three days in court. The national
public defender will now be paid for the basic salary of four pretrial
conference hearings for 170,000 yen ($2,100) and 240,000 yen ($3,000)
for uncontested and contested cases respectively. When there are
two or more defendants, the fees for the defendant who contested
their criminal charges reduced to 190,000 yen ($2,300).150
The original JFBA guideline also suggested 773,000 yen ($9,600)
for five pretrial conference hearings and twenty hours over five
days of trial, while the government suggested that 300,000 yen($3,700) for pretrial hearings of 5 to 7 attendance with a trial of three
days or more. There are other considerations as to the content and
extent of services that defense attorneys are legally able to provide
to the defendant, which would improve the monetary rewards for
the court-appointed defense lawyers.151 Nonetheless, the job of
criminal defense still falls far short of being financially lucrative
given the amount of labor it requires, especially compared with
other civil service and consulting work. Overall, the JSRC
recommendations aimed to establish an effective legal service
organization and to provide legal counseling services at both the
pre- and post-indictment stages of criminal justice process. The
number of trial attorneys willing to work as court-appointed
defense counsels also increased exponentially after the introduction
of the American-style law schools in 2004 and implementation of the
Saiban-in trial in 2009, and the new and more rewarding salary
structure for court-appointed defense lawyers in the Saiban-in trial
and other criminal cases laid out the stable economic foundation to a
large group of young and new practicing attorneys in Japan. 152
148. Marushima, supra note 5.
149. The dollar conversion is based on the ratio of one dollar being equivalent to
approximately 80 Japanese yen.
150. JLSC, supra note 147, at 46.
151. Id.
152. Kenji Utsunomiya, Speech for SR1 Session at ABA in San Francisco: Changes
of Role of Lawyers Over the Past Ten Years, at 2-3 (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
http://www2.americanbar.org/calendar/section-of-interational-law-2010-annual
-meeting-san-francisco-ca/Documents/Utsunomiya%20Speech.pdf (in recognizing
that "the unprecedented rapid increase in the lawyer population has led to the
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H. Victim Participation Programs
The JSRC recommendation emphasized the importance of
extending legal protection to crime victims, as well as the creation of
a liaison conference between crime victims and related government
agencies. 53 The JSRC recommendation also pointed out that public
prosecutors are obliged to take into consideration "the feeling of
victims of crime" in their investigative process of rape and other
sexually explicit or sensitive cases.154
Since December 2008, victims and their families have been
allowed to participate in criminal proceedings, following the
implementation of a revised Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP).155
Victim participation became available for cases of intentional crimes
such as indecent assault and rape, or ones that result in the death of
a person or serious bodily injury or death through negligent
conduct in breach of duty of care or in automobile operation, arrest
and confinement, or kidnapping and human trafficking.156
Historically, crime victims and their families were only allowed
to watch the trial from the gallery seats, but the new law positioned
them as active participants of the prosecutorial processes, allowing
them opportunities to express their opinions about the facts
concerned and the application of law, examine and question
witnesses and the accused if necessary, submit their recommended
sentences, and offer supplemental closing arguments in addition to
those of the prosecutor. 57
problem of young lawyers having difficulty finding jobs," JFBA President
Utsunomiya stated that "[A]ccess to court-appointed attorneys has now has [sic]
been expanded . .. [and] over 50% of the attorneys throughout the country have
registered in the rolls for court-appointed defense attorneys"). For the
establishment of Japan's law school system and its impact on legal profession, see
Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese law school system was Established: Co-Optation as a
Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressure, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 365 (2009).
153. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. II, Pt. 2 (5).
154. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. III, Pt. 4 (1) ("Elevation of the Quality and
Ability Demanded of Public Prosecutors").
155. For detailed historical analyses of the emergence of Japan's recent victim
participation program, see Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Increasing Punitiveness
and the Rising Populism in Japanese Criminal Justice Policy, 10 PUNISHMENT & Soc'y 47
(2008). See also Masahiko Saeki, Victim Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan, 38
INT'L J.L, CRIM., & JUST. 149 (2010).
156. See Toshihiro Kawaide, Victim's Participation in the Criminal Trial in Japan, 10
J. JAPAN-NETHERLANDS INST. 48 (2010).
157. See Koichi Hamai & Tom Ellis, Genbatsuka: Growing Penal Populism and the
Changing Role of Public Prosecutors in Japan?, 33 JAPANESE J. Soc. CRIMINOLOGY 67 (2008),
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Today the JLSC provides systemic assistance to crime victims
and their families in multiple ways, mainly through their victim
participation system. The center also provides attorney candidates
for victim participants and designates and notifies the court of the
candidates of court-appointed lawyers based on the requests of
victim participants. The court is then required to select a lawyer for
victim participants since many of them have limited financial
resources.158
There are three major problems with Japan's victim
participation system when applied to Saiban-in trials. First, victims
themselves are not independent from the criminal justice process,
and as a result, are required to work collaboratively with Japanese
prosecutors. When victims' opinions and strategies of their trial
participation do not comply with those of prosecutorial strategies
and trial process, they may not be presented in court at all.159 In
comparison to the victim participation system in Germany which
civil law system became the bedrock of Japan's legal foundation,160
the Japanese counterpart has largely failed to exert its judicial
independence and authority from the influence of prosecutors. For
example, German victim participants are given the equal legal status
as those of prosecutors and defendants and are allowed to appeal
prosecutorial decisions, if necessary. 161
Active trial participation by crime victims in Japan is also
problematic because the guilt of the defendant of an accused crime
has yet to be established at the conviction phase of the criminal trial.
Because of the legal uncertainty that the defendant may or may not
be the true perpetrator of the alleged crime, participation of crime
victims in the conviction phase of the trial violates the precept of the
available at http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/icjs/staff/documentation/
filetodownload,86506,enpdf. See also JAPANESE CABINET OFFICE, Column: Support for Cime
Victims From the Japanese Legal Support Center (2009), available at http://www8.cao.
go.jp/hanzai/whitepaper/english/2009/pdf/p26-30. pdf.
158. JAPANESE CABINET OFFICE, supra note 157 (suggesting that the requirement
for applying for victim participation is that their total wealth must not exceed 1.5
million yen ($18,700)).
159. Junko Komatsu, Higaisha Sanka Seido no Mondai-ten to Kadai [Victim
Participation Systems, Their Problems, and Challenges], FACULTY OF LAW, KEIo U. (Oct.
19, 2010), available at http://www.clb.1aw.mita.keio.ac.jp/ohta/openzemi2.pdf.
160. Shigenori Matsui, Turbulence Ahead: The Future of Law Schools in Japan, 62 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 3 (2012) ("[T]he legal system in Japan was almost entirely based on
the German civil law system.")
161. Id.
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presumed innocence in the criminal process, and victims' expressed
condemnation and explosion of emotive sentiments in the
courtroom certainly has the potential to tip the scale of justice
toward conviction of the defendants.
Secondly, Japan's victims were barred from participating in
criminal cases where prosecutors decided not to indict. This is
contrary to the German system where victims can use legal means to
mount a private prosecution of criminal cases. 162 The only venue
left for Japan's crime victims is to file a complaint to the local PRC,
hoping that its review may result in a forced prosecution of criminal
suspects.
Another problem of crime victim participation is victim
participants' use of the compensation of damage order system
[Songai Baisho Meirei Seido]. Once guilt is established in court, the
JLSC assists victims in their application for the compensation of
damages, enabling the court to order perpetrator reparations for
damages and making it possible to reduce the necessary time or
financial and mental burden through the initiation of a civil suit
against criminal defendants. While defendants can appeal the
court's compensatory order, this quasi-civil system of the victim
participation program prevents the traditional avenue for out-of-
court settlements between crime victims and crime perpetrators.
Ibaragi Bar Association President Yundo Adachi once pointed out
that victim participation often exposes the negativity of criminal
offenses and accentuates the excessive malice engaged in by the
perpetrators, thereby reducing the possible cooperation and
collaboration required to reach equitable settlements by both
parties.163 While the defense is allowed to appeal the court decision
on the compensatory order, the damage order system often becomes
detrimental to reconciliatory negotiations necessary to reach out-of-
court settlements that economically strapped crime victims often
desperately desire.
I. Voices of Lay Participants on Crime Victim Participation
Active participation of crime victims in Saiban-in trials also
162. Id.
163. Yundo Adachi, Higaisha Sanka Seido Oyobi Songai Baisho Meirei Seido Do-nyu
ni Hantaisuru Kaicho Seimei [Presidential Announcement Against the Introduction of the
Victim Participation and Compensation of Damage Order Systems] Apr. 19, 2007 (on file
with the author).
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introduced many ambiguities and increased doubts about the
program's deliberative merits among lay participants themselves.
In the Supreme Court Report on the Saiban-in trials in 2011, one layjudge complained that "there was a discrepancy in the statements
made by the defendant and the victim ... We, the lay judges, felt
that there was not sufficient amount of evidence in both quality and
quantity." 6 4 Another lay participant stated that there was clear
"contradiction in statement between the victim and defendant.
[There was also] a lack of evidence and we were unable to make a
fair decision."165
Another participant decried that "this system [of crime victim
participation] tends to place much greater emphasis on the feeling
of crime victims, creating a tendency [among us] to impose harsher
sentences upon the defendant. In order for us to make a fair
decision, much improvement must be made to this existing
system." 66 While one Saiban-in judge said that "the experience was
heartbreaking, after facing both family members of both the
defendant and crime victim,"167 another stated that "I did not know
what was proper to believe between the crime victim and the
defendant, including their families. I try not to think deeply and let
it drag down later on." 68
One lay participant said that trial participation of victims and
their families had a long-lasting impact, adding that "I felt the
applicative limit of law, shared nuances of utter mortification of
crime victims, wondering what is just and fair throughout the trial.
Even I returned home, I was so stressed psychologically that I had
to cry often."169
Conversely, some called for the increase in active victim
participation because the prosecutors often resorted to reciting the
statement made by victims without letting them to speak in person
during the trial, and thus there was "not sufficient materials of
164. JAPAN SUPREME COURT, Saiban-in to Keikensha ni Taisuru Anke-to: Chosa Kekka
Hokoku-sho: Heisei 23-nendo [Survey on Quasi-Jury Participants: Report of Analytic
Results for the Year 2011] [hereinafter 2011 Survey], 144 (March 2012), available at
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/pdf/09 12_05-10jissi-jyoukyou/h23
q1.pdf.
165. Id. at 172.
166. Id. at 165.
167. Id. at 159.
168. Id. at 160.
169. Id. at 163.
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evidence both in quantity and quality. We heard direct testimony of
defendants, but for crime victims, it was only investigative materials
and statements [introduced in trial] and it was difficult [for us] to
understand the true feeling of crime victims. I wish we heard direct
testimony from the victims."170 In 2009, another lay participant
made a similar comment on victim participation that "I wanted to
know more about the daily activities of both the victim and
defendant, their life experience, and personal characters, which
were not presented in the trial."171 Another lay judge emphasized
the necessity of direct participation of related parties, including
crime victims, stating that "there was no chance to directly
communicate with defendant, victim, or prosecutors, or defense
attorney [to have a better understanding of the trial]."172
One lay judge said that victim participation was important
because "I had a profound feeling and thought about the crime, its
background and motives. It gave me an opportunity to share the
feeling of a defendant and victim."173 Another participant said that
both crime victim participation and defendant testimony deepened
the understanding of the trial process, stating that "I have always
looked at the case from the victim's perspective, but now I know
multitudes of reasons and complex backgrounds also exist on the
side of defendants as well."1 74
After having said that he/she developed a better understanding
of the situation of crime victims, one lay judge added, "even if it
were a temporal experience, I experienced something I never did
before, including the [understanding of] life history of the defendant,
and an opportunity to think about feelings of crime victims."175
Another lay participant summarized the experience with testimony
made by both a defendant and victim, stating that "I felt a
tremendous relief once my duty was over, and our decision was
something reasonable for both a victim and defendant. [The
170. Id. at 172.
171. JAPAN SUPREME COURT, Saiban-in to Keikensha ni Taisuru Anke-to: Chosa Kekka
Hokokusho: Heisei 21-nendo [Survey on Quasi-Jury Participants: Report of Analytic
Results for the Year 2011] [hereinafter 2009 Survey], 126 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/pdf/09_12_05-10jissi-jyoukyou/0 3 -
1.pdf.
172. Id. at 160.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 141.
175. 2011 Survey, supra note 164, at 182.
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decision is] something people in our society could accept. Or
perhaps some other decision may have been proper, but all these
feelings are integrated together inside [our decision]."176
Lastly, some lay judges were initially reluctant to participate in
the Saiban-in trial specifically because they did not want to become
emotionally involved with crime victims or defendants. In
particular, one lay judge, who originally did not want to serve in a
trial because he/she did not want to be involved in cases related to
crimes or anything that can endanger one's life or body or safety,
said, "It is burdensome to pass on a judgment based on my personal
feeling, and I also felt that it is also a heavy responsibility to have
some kind of connection with the defendant and/or crime victims
and other people affected by the crime."177
While the JSRC's suggestion was important for extending
participatory rights of crime victims within the justice system, the
victim participation program seemed to pose multitudes of
problems especially with respect to the ambiguities and confusions
among lay participants who pointed out significant discrepancies in
the testimonies given by defendants and crime victims, which likely
affect the content of discussions in the deliberation. The 2010
defense lawyer survey in Yokohama also indicated that, in trials
where the defendants disputed the crime, "the testimony by crime
victims failed to match or even make any reasonable sense against
the testimony given by defendants. [Victim testimony] does not
even corroborate with arguments presented by prosecutors or the
court."1 78 Legal scholar Shinichi Ishizuka also pointed out that
crime victim participation in the Saiban-in trial dilutes a clear
separation of the conviction and sentencing phases of judicial
decision-making, and victim participation became the prosecutors'
effective instrument and procedural tool to help convict criminal
defendants by exploiting the emotive outrage of victims against
defendants. Thus, Ishizuka warns against the use of the victim
participation programs in the Saiban-in trial, suggesting that the
final trial rendering must be strictly based on investigative materials,
176. Id. at 186.
177. 2009 Survey, supra note 171, at 141.
178. HIRONORI TAKEUCHI, HIGAISHA SANKA ANKE-TO NO KEKKA HOKOKU [REPORT
ON THE RESULTS ON CRIME VicTIM PARTICIPATION SURVEY] 1 (2011), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/conunittee/list/data/higaisha-enquete.
pdf.
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forensic evidence, and/ or credible testimonies given by related
parties only, thereby excluding crime victims and their families.179
IV. Collateral Impact of Two Systems of Lay Adjudication
A. Citizen Adjudication of Military Crimes in Saiban-in Trials
The twin systems of lay adjudication, namely the Saiban-in trial
and revised Prosecution Review Commissions (PRC), have had
significant socio-political ramifications for many Japanese citizens
who have long felt vulnerable and helpless against policies of the
government and predatory business practices of powerful
corporations. The first significant, collateral impact of the
introduction of the Saiban-in trial was the lay adjudication of
military crimes committed by U.S. Armed Forces personnel
stationed in Japan. In May 2010, a 19-year-old American soldier in
Okinawa was tried for robbery and injuring a cab driver. 180 A
judicial panel of five female and one male lay judges and three
professional judges convicted and sentenced the soldier to three to
four years in a Japanese prison.181 One lay judge, in a post-verdict
interview, said that he hopes the sentence "would serve as a
deterrence" to American military personnel who often commit
crimes in Okinawa.182 The written judgment by the court also
echoed the importance of having severe sentences acting as an
effective deterrence against pervasive military personnel's crimes
against Japanese citizens in Okinawa, stating that the trial outcome
"cannot ignore deterrent effects against similar crimes from being
committed in the future."183 This Saiban-in trial became the first ever
trial of an American serviceman in Japan's lay court.
The second Saiban-in trial commenced in Okinawa in December
2010, when another American soldier was adjudicated by the lay
judges for sexual assaults. 184 After three days of trial, the panel of
179. Shin'ichi Ishizuka, Keiji Saiban ni Okeru Higaisha no Yakuwari [The Role of
Crime Victims in Criminal Trials], 36 GENDAI SHIHO 92 (2008).
180. For this trial, see Fukurai, supra note 8.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 797.
183. Hanketsu Shushi [Final Judgment], at 3 (May 27, 2010).
184. David Allen & Chiyomi Sumida, Marine Indicted on Sexual Assault and
Trespassing Charges on Okinawa, STARS & STRIPES (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.
stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/marine-indicted-on-sexual-assault-and-
trespassing-charges-on-okinawa-1.115882.
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lay and professional judges found the American defendant guilty
and sentenced him to three years and six months in a Japanese
prison.185
Why are so many crimes committed by American military
personnel in Okinawa? It is important to note that Okinawa was
once an independent kingdom before Japan annexed it as part of the
jurisdictional territory by the modem Japanese state in 1879. The
new Japanese government then treated the Okinawa islands as a de-
facto advance military outpost for the defense of main Japanese
islands, as well as a strategic forwarding base to project its colonial
policies in the rest of Southeast Asia. As a result, from the first days
of the Asian-Pacific War with the Allied Forces, the Islands of
Okinawa were fortified to serve as key strategic locations for
airbases and bastions of defense for Japan's main islands.
In the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, more than ten thousand
American soldiers, ninety thousand Japanese troops, and more than
one hundred thousand Okinawans, which is nearly one-third of
Okinawa's prefectural population at the time of war, died over a
nearly ninety-day battle in Okinawa.186 After Japan lost the war in
1945, the U.S. and Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in
1951, and the U.S. government declared Okinawa as its main
military colony, and from then on has used it as an important
strategic military outpost for the wars in Korea and Vietnam. 87
Today, Japan serves as a strategic home for the U.S. Third
Marine Division, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the U.S. Forces Japan,188
and three quarters of American military facilities in Japan are
located on the island of Okinawa.189 The Japanese government
185. Kyosei Waisetsu Chisho Beihei no Koso Kikyaku [Denial of Appeal by American
Soldier Convicted of Sexual Assault], OKINAWA TIMES, May 11, 2011.
186. Fukurai, supra note 27, at 794-95.
187. Id.
188. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline: A
summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory 7 [hereinafter Base Structure] (2011),
available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/bsr2011baseline.pdf. See
also U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, Active Duty Military Personnel Strength by Regional Area
and by Country 3 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/report/2011/hst1103.pdf. See also CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS
178 (2008) (Using various governmental data, Johnson stated that "the United States
had stationed some 36,365 uniformed military personnel in Japan, not counting
11,887 sailors attached to the Seventh Fleet at its bases at Yokosuka (Kanagawa
Prefecture) and Sasebo (Nagasaki Prefecture).").
189. Johnson, supra note 188, at 179.
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reports that between 1952 and 2004, American soldiers, military
employees, and dependents committed crimes or caused accidents
in a total of 201,481 cases that resulted in the death of 1,076
civilians.190 The data, however, excludes crimes or accidents on the
Island of Okinawa from 1945 to 1972, during which Okinawa
remained under U.S. military jurisdiction. Despite the widespread
victimization of local residents by military personnel and
dependents, there had never been a lay trial in Japan against foreign
soldiers, their dependents, or civic military employees. Direct
citizen participation in Saiban-in trials thus became the first
important legal mechanism against the culture of impunity shared
among many American soldiers toward residents in Okinawa and
other Japanese islands with large U.S. military bases.
B. Broader Investigative Applications of the PRC Oversight
Function
A unique feature of the new Prosecutorial Review Commissions
(PRC) is its ability to extend the investigative jurisdiction beyond
criminal cases to possible civil and administrative matters such as
malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance against public officers
and/or corporate elites. With the PRC's new ability to issue legally
binding prosecutorial decisions, it has now become the single-most
important institution of civic oversight over the allegation of
corporate predation and governmental abuse of power.
Immediately after the implementation of the new PRC Act in
2009, all-citizen panels issued the forced indictment for the Deputy
Police Chief of the Akashi Police Station in the Hyogo Prefecture in
January,191 and three past presidents of JR-West, one of Japan's
largest and most powerful corporations, in March 2010.192
190. Hiroshi Hayashi, Higashi Ajia no Beigunkichi to Seibaibai, Seihanzai [American
Military Bases in East Asia, Prostitution and Sexual Crime], 29 AMERICA-SHI KENKYU 1
(2006), available at http://www.geocities.jp/hhhirofumi/paper75.pdf (referring to
crime statistics provided by the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency,
on July 1, 2005).
191. Akashi Hodokyo Jiko: Naze Koredake Jikanga Kakattanoka - Izoku Kaiken [Akashi
Pedestrian Incidents: Why Did It Take This Long? - Testimony of Victims' Families]
[hereinafter Akashi], SANKEl NEws (an. 27, 2010), http://sankei.jp.msn.
com/affairs/trial/100127/trl1001272216017-nl.htm.
192. JR Nishi Rekidai 3 Shacho, Kyoseikisoe: Kobe Daiichi Kensatsu ga Kiso Giketsu
[Kobe PRC Decides on Indictment Against Three JR-West Presidents] [hereinafter JR
Nishi], SANKEi NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010), http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/
crime/100326/crml003261636020-nl.htm.
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Despite numerous calls for the prosecution of the Akashi
Deputy Police Chief for his failure to institute effective police
oversight to prevent a deadly stampede incident in Akashi City in
2001, the Japanese prosecution refused to initiate an official criminal
investigation on numerous occasions. 193 The deadly stampede
resulted in the injuries of 274 people and deaths of nine children,
ranging from five months to nine years of age, who were crushed to
death in a crowded pedestrian bridge. 194 Upon the receipt of a civic
complaint to the Hyogo Prosecutorial Review Commission, the civic
panel deliberated the case on numerous occasions, deciding each
time that the officer be indicted and prosecuted, but local
prosecutors continued to ignore the PRC recommendations. 195 The
prosecutors' disregard for the PRC's decisions continued until 2009,
when the families of the victim resubmitted their complaint to the
PRC once again to recommend that the officer be indicted and
prosecuted. 196 The second PRC decision finally forced the local
prosecutors to indict and prosecute the police officer. 197
After setting a new precedent on the forcible indictment against
the deputy police chief, the PRC in the same prefecture went on to
deliberate on a corporate malfeasance case involving a train
derailment incident, which killed 107 and injured 555 others. 1 98
After a brief investigation, the Japanese prosecutors decided not to
indict the three former presidents of the JR-West, indicating that
they were not directly responsible for the failure to install the
Automatic Train Stop (ATP) system, which could have halted the
speeding train from slamming itself into a multi-story parking
garage in the ground floor of the nearby apartment building.199 The
Hyogo PRC decided that the leading cause of the deadly accident
was the company's mismanagement and administrative policy that
favored its profit motives over the safety of their customers. 200 In
March 2010, the PRC decided for the second time that the three
193. Fukurai, supra note 2, at 345-47.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Akashi, supra note 191.
198. JR West, Victims' Relatives Mark Amagasaki Crash, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005),
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20051026a4.html.
199. Id.
200. JR West's Actions Show Lack of Remorse, Resolve, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 24, 2009,
at 4.
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former JR-West presidents be indicted for professional negligence
resulting in injuries and deaths. 201
The recent forced prosecution of corporate and government
elites also demonstrated that the PRC's investigative authority
might be easily extended to crimes committed by other social
groups that Japanese prosecutors have been historically reluctant to
prosecute. This includes the American Armed Forces personnel
stationed in Japan. In January 2011, a vehicle driven by a 24-year-
old American military employee killed a 19-year-old Japanese driver
in Okinawa. 20 2 Okinawa prosecutors decided not to indict the
military employee because they determined that the accident took
place while he was on duty, and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) grants the U.S. military the right to exercise
primary jurisdiction over on-duty crimes or incidents.203 In April, a
mother of a deceased youth filed a complaint with the Naha PRC to
review the Okinawa prosecutors' non-indictment decision. 204
Meanwhile, further investigations into the cause of the traffic
accident revealed that the American driver consumed alcohol at an
official party at the U.S. military base prior to the accident.205 In
May, the Naha PRC chose to reverse the prosecutors' non-
indictment decision, stating that the indictment was proper for the
given case. 206
After the PRC announced its decision to prosecute the
individual, the U.S. and Japanese governments decided to begin a
round of discussions on new rules that may allow civilian workers
201. JR Nishi, supra note 191.
202. Japanese Man Dies After Vehicle Collision with AAFES Employee on Okinawa,
STARS & STRIPES (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/Okinawa/
japanese-man-dies-after-vehicle-collision-with-aafes-employee-on-okinawa-
1.131710.
203. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto Chiikyotei ga Hikokusekini ["Indictment is Proper" for
Military Employee: SOFA is on Defendant's Seat] [hereinafter Beigunzoku, Kisosoto],
OKINAWA TIMEs (May 29, 2011), http://www.okinawa- times.co.jp/article/2011-05-
29_18467.
204. Beigunzoku Fukiso Izoku Kenshin ni Fufuku Mositate [Victim's Family Files
Complaint to the PRC Against the Non-Indictment of American Military Employee],
RYuKYu SHINPO (Apr. 25, 2011), http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-176467-
storytopic-111.html.
205. Drinking at U.S.F 'Official Event' Is Regarded as Part of 'Official Duty,' JAPAN
PRESS WEEKLY, (Apr. 24 & 26, 2011), http://www.japan-press.co.jp/modules
/news/index.php?id=1784.
206. Beigunzoku, Kisosoto, supra note 203.
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in American military bases to be tried in Japanese court for incidents
that occur while on-duty, and in November, a bilateral
governmental committee finally agreed on a new interpretation of
the SOFA guidelines, in which the U.S. military still retains primary
jurisdiction in cases involving military personal who are on official
business. However, if the U.S. military declines to prosecute a
civilian component of military personnel, Japan has 30 days to
formally request permission to try the case in its own court
system.207 Two days after both governments reached the agreement,
the Naha prosecutors indicted the American military employee and
a Japanese court convicted and sentenced him to eighteen months in
Japanese prison. 208 The sentence of incarceration was a stark
contrast to the previous year's U.S. military decision to simply
punish the defendant by revoking his driving privilege for five
years. 209
For three years from 2008 and 2010, Japanese prosecutors had
decided not to indict 52 American military employees because of the
SOFA provision.210 The PRC forced the bilateral discussion on the
legality of the SOFA jurisdiction over on-duty crimes or accidents
caused by American military personnel and made possible the
forced prosecution of civilian components of U.S. Armed Forces
personnel. Its very existence provides effective civic oversight of the
conduct and activities of American military personnel in Okinawa
and other prefectures in the main islands that have U.S. military
bases and facilities.
207. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Surnida, AAFES Employee Indicted in Fatal
Collision, STARS & STRIPES (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/aafes-
employee-indicted-in-fatal-collision-1.161616.
208. Travis J. Tritten & Chiyomi Sumida, American on Okinawa Gets 18 Months in
Prison for Vehicular Manslaughter, STARS & STRIPES (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.
stripes.com/news/pacific/okinawa/american-on-okinawa-gets-18-months-in-
prison-for-vehicular-manslaughter-1.169343.
209. Id.
210. Beigunzoku no Hanzai, Sabakarezu 06-nen Kara Saibanken ni Kuhaku [Non-
Prosecution of Crimes Committed by Military Employees: Lack of Jurisdiction Since 2006],
ASAHI SHIMBUN, (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.asahi.com/national/update/1112/
TKY201111120625.html.
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V. Possible Applications of Saiban-in Trials to Civil and
Administrative Litigation211
The next step to further democratize Japan's legal system is to
consider the application of Saiban-in trials in civil and administrative
matters, beyond just criminal cases. The possible adoption of lay
adjudication in civil disputes sheds further critical insight into the
JSRC's report, which originally suggested a possible expansion of
citizen participation into certain civil cases. Nonetheless, the
investigation committee created by the Reform Promotion Office to
implement the JSRC recommendation had failed to propose any
substantive model of citizen participation in civil law.
A. Application of Quasi-Jury Trials to Civil Disputes
With respect to citizen participation in civil justice, the JSRC
report emphasized the importance of introducing citizen
participation into "litigation procedures as expert commissioners ...
[and citizens are to be] involved in all or part of trials and
support[ing] judges from the standpoint of their own specialized
expertise." 212 The JSRC report also anticipated a broader civic
participatory model in other areas in the near future, stating that "a
new system [of a mixed tribunal] should be introduced, for the time
being in criminal proceedings, enabling the broad general public to
cooperate with judges by sharing responsibilities, and to take part
autonomously and meaningfully in deciding trials [emphasis
added]." 213
Since the Japanese government was required to review the
system of the Saiban-in trial on the third year of its operation in 2012,
any discussion on the possible adoption of lay adjudication in civil
or even administrative disputes will have tremendous socio-legal
211. Professor Matthew J. Wilson at the University of Wyoming College of Law
discussed the importance of extending lay adjudication into the area of civil
disputes. See Matthew J. Wilson, Prime Time to Take Another Step Forward: Expanding
Lay Participation in Japan from Serious Criminal Trials to Civil Trials 2012), 46 AKRON L.
REV. - (2013) (publication forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssm.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2063269. This section extends his discussions and
examines the application of lay adjudication into specific areas of civic and
administrative disputes in Japan.
212. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. IV, Pt. 1 (2) (1) ("Expansion of Participation
Systems in Other Fields (1) Civil justice System").
213. JSRC REPORT, supra note 1, Ch. IV, Pt. 1 (1) ("Introduction of New
Participation System in Criminal Proceedings").
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ramifications in today's Japanese society.
For example, the Saiban-in trial may be adopted in civil cases
involving radiation victims of the Fukushima nuclear disasters. In
March 2011, the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant spewed high radioactive particles into the atmosphere and
contaminating hundreds of thousands of residents in Fukushima
Prefecture and adjacent areas.214 An independent Diet commission
that investigated the Fukushima catastrophe concluded in July 2012
that the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant was "man-made and
not a natural disaster, fundamentally [as] the result of a long-
corrupt regulatory system that allowed Tokyo Electric Power Co.
(TEPCO) to put off critical safety measures." 215 Nonetheless, the
Japanese court so far has repeatedly refused civil damage claims to
TEPCO brought by its stockholders, radiation victims, and their
families. 216
Citizen participation in civil and administrative matters related
to the victims of the Fukushima nuclear disaster will allow the
deeper consideration and discussion on the protection of the rights
of the victims and to help secure their rightful claim to economic
redress for damages created by the nuclear power plant owned and
operated by TEPCO. Radiation victims also claim compensation
against the Japanese government which granted TEPCO the
continuous operation of nuclear plants despite prior records on the
systematic violation of safety regulations and numerous
falsifications of inspection records at the Fukushima power plant. 217
214. Japanese Nuclear Crisis: Year Later, Uncertainties Remain, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Mar. 10, 2012, at A19.
215. Kazuaki Nagata, Nuclear Crisis Man-Made: Diet Panel, JAPAN TIMES, Jul. 6,
2012.
216. Toden no Menseki Hitei wa Tekiho, Kabunushi no Baisho Seikyu o Kyakka
[TEPCO's Immunity to Responsibility is Lawful: Court's Denial to Compensatory Liability
by Stockholders], SANKEi NEWS (Jul. 19, 2012), http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/
news/120719/trl12071916250005-nl.htm; Tadano Jisatsu ni Shitakunai: Genpatsujiko ni
Jisatsu, Izokura Toden Teiso [Refuse to Treat it as Mere Suicide: Bereaved Family Sued
TEPCO for Suicide After Nuclear Accident], SANKEI NEWS (May 18, 2012),
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/120518/trl12051818250003-nl.htm; Toden
ni Baisho Motome Teiso, Iwate de Hatsu, Kome Seisan-hojin [First Time, Rice Producers in
Iwate Prefecture Filed Lawsuit to Seek Compensation for TEPCO], KYODO (May 2, 2012),
http://www.47news.jp/feature/kyodo/news5/2012/05/post-5530.html; Kazuaki
Nagata, Protest Rally Against Noda, Oi Restarts Intensifies, JAPAN TIMES, June 30, 2012
(stating that the class-action lawsuit was filed by "42 shareholders of Tokyo Electric
Power Co.... [to] pay 5.5 trillion [yen] in total damages to TEPCO").
217. Hiroshi Fukurai, The Embracement of the Atomic Energy Program in Japan: The
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University of Wyoming Law Professor Matthew Wilson
provides the following two important rationales for extending the
application of Saiban-in trials to civil disputes: (1) participation in
civil disputes would strengthen, educate, and empower the general
citizenry; and (2) lay adjudication will also promote better reflection
of societal values and policy. 218 Professor Wilson further suggested
that "extending the lay judge system to ... civil trials is consistent
with ... [the JSRC] reforms. . . . Japan should take advantage of the
current environment and seriously explore the possibility of
integrating citizen participation into the civil justice system." 219 Lay
adjudication in future civil disputes involving TEPCO and
government liabilities certainly creates a space where people's
sentiments and sense of civil justice will be introduced into the
deliberation of future civil cases.
B. Application of Quasi-Jury Trials to Administrative Cases
The JSRC recommendation suggested a possible application of
lay adjudication in civil areas. Nonetheless, the JSRC failed to make
specific suggestions on the implementation of lay participation in
administrative disputes.
Attorney Shunsuke Marushima, a keynote speaker in the UC
Hastings symposium on the impact of the JSRC reform, stated that
the number of administrative litigation cases brought to Japanese
court has been historically very low - only 1,400 cases were filed in
2000.220 The rate of rejection was about 20%, and Japanese courts
ruled in favor of the plaintiff in only 10% to 15% of administrative
cases. 221 And although the number of administrative litigation has
somewhat increased to 2,100 in 2010, a total number of cases still
remain extremely low in comparison to administrative litigation in
other countries. 222 Attorney Marushima suggested that that
administrative litigation was a form of legal procedure that has been
extremely difficult for citizens to use in settling disputes, and in the
U.S. Government, Japanese Nuclear Ambition, and Corporate Profitization on the Nuclear
Energy Programs, a paper presented at the Second East Asian Law and Society
Conference in Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 1, 2011 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author).
218. Wilson, supra note 211, at 19-21.
219. Id. at 25.
220. Marushima, supra note 97.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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majority of administrative cases, Japanese courts ruled in favor of
the government or public institutions over citizens. 223 And that was
one of the major factors why the number of Japan's administrative
cases has been relatively very small.224
The JSRC report helped to initiate extended discussions on how
to strengthen the checking function of administrative litigation by
the judiciary; it also helped to pass the first revision of the
Administrative Litigation Act. 22 The first revision of the act
contained a provision toward expanding one's legal standing to file
a lawsuit, mandating litigation injunction, and extending the statute
of limitations for filing cases. 22 6 Nonetheless, many unresolved
challenges still remain, as the second phase of the review for
revisions was scheduled to commence in five years.227 And even as
the Administrative Appeal Act and the freedom of information
system have been enacted, Attorney Marushima indicated that there
has been little political interest for reform in the second phase of the
planned reviews.22 8
If the adjudication of administrative cases was given in the
hands of Saiban-in participants, not in the collegial bench of
professional judges, many plaintiffs may find it advantageous to file
administrative lawsuits against the government or other public
institutions. There should be serious discussions on determining
the mitigated requirements for mandatory litigation injunction and
provisional relief for the plaintiffs, strengthening the review of
administrative discretion, and establishing planned litigation and
litigations involving court orders.22 9 Such reforms must target all
appropriate administrative agencies or affected groups of citizens to
initiate significant changes in Japan's adjudication of administrative
cases and advance the substantive administrative law in Japan.
VI. Conclusions
On September 7th and 8th 2012, the UC Hastings conference
assembled a group of socio-legal scholars to examine the extent of
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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the implementation of the judicial reforms suggested in the JSRC's
2001 report. This article then examined the ramification of the
proposed judicial reforms in the area of criminal justice and lay
participation in legal decision-making.
The establishment of the National Public Defender System and
the Japan Legal Support Center in 2006 provided vital legal
resources and services to criminal suspects and defendants at both
the pre- and post-indictment stages of the criminal process. Both
institutions also helped eliminate many regions and areas that
previously had very limited access to lawyers and legal experts. On
the other hand, little to no significant changes were made to
discriminatory police investigative procedures. The JSRC
recommendations failed to eliminate some of the important key
factors that led to wrongful convictions and violations of criminal
defendants' rights, including the use of police detention centers as
substitute prisons for interrogating criminal suspects and extracting
forced confessions. The police and prosecution continue to conduct
interrogation activities without the use of an audio and visual
recording device during interrogation. The investigation committee
(LAMPIC) also failed to implement a pre-indictment bail system; a
criminal suspect in Japan is still unable to obtain his or her release
from police custody at the pre-indictment stage of the criminal
process.
Despite these shortcomings, perhaps the greatest achievement
of the JSRC was the creation of the Saiban-in system where citizens
participate in determining trial outcomes and sentences. It is
monumental considering that it took more than six decades to
introduce a new system of lay adjudication after Japan's military
government suspended the jury system in 1943. The JSRC
recommendation also made a significant procedural improvement
on the PRC by giving its decisions legally binding force in reviewing
the indictment decisions of prosecutors. The twin systems of lay
adjudication were at the forefront of instigating the prosecution of
previously highly "protected" groups, including prominent
politicians, government bureaucrats, corporate elites, and American
military personnel.
Lastly, this report explored the potential for adopting lay
adjudication in civil litigation, which was previously suggested by
the JSRC report. Such a consideration is significant and timely given
that the Japanese government is required to review the Saiban-in
system after the third year of its operation. After the nuclear
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meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in March
2011, the courts have been persistent in rejecting the lawsuits filed
against TEPCO and the Japanese government by radiation victims
and their families seeking proper redress. Now is the time for the
Japanese government to reconsider the possible extension of lay
participation into legal decision-making in civil and administrative
matters.
